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Abstract 
Network Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, which exhaust the server resources and 
network bandwidth, can make the target servers unable to provide proper service 
to the legitimate users and in some cases render the target systems inoperable 
and/or the target networks inaccessible. DoS attacks have now become a serious 
and common security threat to the Internet community. Public Key Infrastructure 
(PKI) has long been incorporated in various authentication protocols to facilitate 
verifying the identities of the communicating parties. The use of PKI has, however, 
an inherent problem as it involves expensive computational operations such as 
modular exponentiation. An improper deployment of the public-key operations in 
a protocol could create an opportunity for the attacker to exhaust the server's 
resources. 
In this thesis, we propose and implement a public-key based authentication 
and key establishment protocol coupled with a sophisticated client puzzle, which 
together provide a versatile solution for DoS attacks, and various other common 
attacks. Besides authentication, the protocol also supports a joint establishment of 
session key by both the client and the server, which protects the session 
communications after the mutual authentication and allows for symmetric 
cryptography to be deployed during the interactive session. The proposed protocol 
has been validated using a formal logic theory based on the logic of belief and the 
i 
logic of knowledge; and has been shown, through security analysis, able to resist, 
besides DoS attacks, various other common attacks. The underlying client puzzle 
protocol can also be integrated with other network protocols to defend against the 
denial-of-service attacks. 
The proposed authentication protocol has been implemented and tested. The 
experimental results show that the proposed protocol is computationally efficient, 
and is also effective in handling DoS attacks as the server load can be reduced 
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1.1 Motivations and Objectives 
The Internet has become for almost two decades one of the most popular 
communication media. According to a survey conducted by Nua [1], there are 
544.2 million Internet users worldwide by February 2002. The Internet usage is 
still increasing worldwide. According to Nielsen/NetRatings [2], between April 
2001 and April 2002, the time spent online per month and the number of sessions 
per month both increased by approximately 13 percent and 9 percent respectively. 
The fast and global natures of the Internet have brought great convenience to our 
daily life and business. The IDC's Internet Commerce Market Model (ICMM) 
reported that the worldwide e-commerce revenue (including both business-to-
business and business-to-consumer categories) was USD$615.3 billion in 2001, 
increased by 73.4% when compared with the USD$354.9 billion revenue in 2000. 
IDC [3] forecasts that the e-commerce revenue will rise to about USD$1 trillion 
by the end of 2002 and increase to about USD$4 trillion by the end of 2005. 
Besides, companies can also greatly reduce their business cost by conducting their 
operations online. For example, Nua pointed out that an average large US 
company could save at least USD$13.1 million per year by sending their invoices 
to the customers by e-billing, according to Gartner Research [4]. These figures 
tell us that the Internet has taken an important role in the worldwide economics. It 
is becoming more popular and the potential of it is very great. However, the open 
1 
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nature of the Internet has also lead to a great loss to the commercial companies 
and government each year. In 2001 - 2002, eighty percent of the organizations 
acknowledged financial losses due to security breaches. Besides, an organization 
suffers a loss of USD$2.1 million on average from security breaches annually [5]. 
Because of this, the organizations are becoming more aware of the security issues. 
They are also more willing to spend on information security in order to have a 
better and safer electronic business environment. IDC predicts that the US 
information security market will rise from USD$720 million last year to USD$2.2 
billion in 2005. The global security market will also reach USD$21 billion by the 
end of 2005. The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) suggests to the 
business companies that security should no longer be an after-thought; it should 
be part of intelligence, planning and business strategies [6]. So we can foresee that 
the security market and demand is tremendous in future. 
The scope of security is very broad. It is defined as the ability of a system to 
protect information and system resources with respect to confidentiality and 
integrity [7]. There can have many directions and approaches in enhancing the 
security level of an IT system. For example, the installation of firewall and anti-
virus software packages, the deployment of a robust authentication protocol, the 
incorporation of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the installation of bio-metric 
recognition devices, etc. So before making a decision on the security measures to 
adopt, one should decide which aspect of the IT system the security level is going 
to be enhanced. Data privacy has been a main concern of the online users recently. 
In the US, nearly 70 percent of the consumers concerned about their privacy 
online [8]. To provide security and privacy to the online users, there should have 
mechanisms to properly verify the identities of the online entities that wish to 
exchange information. Currently, the online companies are trying their best to 
enhance their authentication services in order to prevent unauthorized access to 
their resources and the private data of their customers, which can lead to great 
losses to the online companies. Actually, the market potential of authentication 
services is very large. It is estimated that the market opportunity for authentication 
services can up to USD$3 - 4 billion annually by 2004 [9]. Apart from 
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authentication, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is another hot security issue 
recently. In 2000, a series of the world most popular web sites, including Yahoo, 
eBay, Amazon.com, and CNN.com, were all knocked down by DoS attacks. A 
subsequent survey found that the confidence of the online consumers has been 
greatly affected by this series of DoS attacks. About 30 percent of the consumers 
said that they were less likely to buy online in future and 70 percent of them said 
that they were very concerned by the attacks, according to Gallup and @Plan [10]. 
Besides, the 2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security survey [5] indicates that 
55 percent of the US organizations have reported denial of service and USD$18.3 
million were lost from DoS attacks annually. 
According to the figures above, the research and market potentials of the 
authentication and DoS attack handling methods are very large. There are many 
different authentication and DoS handling methods proposed in the past decades. 
We have done a survey on these approaches, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter, and noted that they are generally weak in certain aspects. Many of them 
have even shown to be flawed. In this thesis, our objective is to design and 
implement a robust authentication system. The core part of this system is a denial-
of-service resistant public-key authentication and key establishment protocol. Our 
basic strategy in handling the denial-of-service attack is that the server should 
require the client to commit its resources before committing extensive resources 
to the client by the server in an authentication protocol session. This 
authentication and key establishment protocol should protect against different 
types of common attacks and be able to be proved formally. In order to handle 
DoS attacks using the above strategy, we design and incorporate a client puzzle 
protocol into the authentication protocol in order to provide it with the ability to 
defend against DoS attacks. 
1.2 Authentication Protocol 
With the widespread use of the public network and distributed systems, the proof 
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of identities over the public network becomes important. There are different 
entities exchanging information over the network. These entities may be end-users, 
computer hosts, and processes. The information exchanged may involve sensitive 
data such as credit card numbers, government internal documents, and business 
ideas. So every time we receive information from an entity over the public 
network, we expect that the information is indeed fresh, intact, and from the 
sender it claims to be. 
An authentication protocol is a sequence of message exchanges between the 
communicating entities, guaranteeing that if the entities really are who they say 
they are [11]. If the communicating entities in the authentication protocol session 
end up with the possession of a shared session key, the protocol can be termed in a 
more specific way as an authentication and key establishment protocol. This 
established session key could be used for encrypting all information in the 
subsequent session, thus providing a secure communication channel 
between/among the communicating entities. 
The Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol [12] is the most influential 
authentication protocol proposed in the authentication literature. Although it was 
found to be flawed later [11], its design principal forms a basis for the 
authentication protocol designs for years. Nowadays, public key technology 
becomes widely used in authentication protocol designs. Public Key Infrastructure 
is set to become the global standard for encryption and authentication. In 2000, 
the global investment in PKI products and services is USD$436 million. It is 
estimated that the investment will further grow to USD$3.4 billion in 2006 [13]. 
Public key technology is recognized to be one of the basic building blocks in 
authentication protocol design. Unlike its symmetric cryptography counterpart, 
public key cryptography does not require pre-establishment of the shared secret. 
So it is commonly employed in authentication and key establishment protocol to 
establish shared secret for usage in subsequent symmetric cryptography based 
communication session. 
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1.3 Security Technologies 
Within an authentication system or protocol, some basic security technologies are 
commonly used to provide the targeted authentication and key establishment 
functions. Some of these technologies include cryptography, digital certificate, 
one-way hash function, and digital signature. 
1.3.1 Cryptography 
In order to secure the communication between/among the entities on the public 
network, the messages exchange between/among the entities are usually encrypted. 
Even someone else intercepted the encrypted message from the communication 
channel; he cannot get the content from it because the message is encrypted into 
human-unreadable format. Basically, the encryption schemes can be classified into 
one of the two categories: symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption. 
Symmetric encryption is a type of encryption scheme that involves only one 
single encryption key between the communicating entities. For example, if Peter 
want to sends a message to Mary, both of them must agree on a common 
encryption key, K, and then communicate according to the following steps: 
� Peter encrypts the message using the key K, 
� Peter sends the encrypted message to Mary. 
� Mary decrypts the received message using the same key K. 
Peter ^ Encryption B X — — • Decryption N — • Mary read the 
message ’ I ； : I message 
Key K Key 
Figure 1.1: Symmetric encryption 
This method has the disadvantage that the sender must tell the receiver the 
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encryption key beforehand using some secure channels not involving the public 
network, e.g. by paper mail. Besides, the encryption key should be different for 
different receiver. For example, if Peter also want to send a message to Karen, he 
should use another key X, where X should be different from K\ otherwise, Mary 
can also read those encrypted message sent to Karen. Because of these 
disadvantages, there is another type of encryption algorithm: the asymmetric 
encryption algorithm or we may call it the public key cryptography. 
In order to communicate using public key cryptography, every entity involves 
must possess a pair of keys, public key and private key. The public key is publicly 
available, that everyone can access to it. The private key is kept secret by the 
owner of the key. The public key and the private key are mathematically related; a 
message encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted by the 
corresponding private key and vice versa. Using the same example above, when 
Peter wants to send a message to Mary, the steps would now be as follow: 
� Peter obtains Mary's public key from the public area. 
� Peter encrypts the message using Mary's public key. 
� Peter sends the encrypted message to Mary. 
� Mary decrypts the received message using her private key. 
Peter _ _ J Encryption Deu^ption ^ ^ a r y mad 
message ^ ^ ^ the message 
, 2 、 ： 、 、 X , 
Mary Mary 
public key - private key 
Figure 1.2: Asymmetric encryption 
This method solves the problem of the symmetric encryption method where 
the sender must tell the receiver the key before the communication can take place. 
The sender can just get the public key of the receiver from a public place. Also, no 
matter how many receivers the sender wants to talk to, he/she only needs to keep 
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his/her own private key secret; the other keys are being public. While for the 
symmetric key method, the sender has to keep secret all the keys he/she uses to 
talk to his/her receivers. However, the encryption and decryption processes in the 
asymmetric method are slower than that of the symmetric method because one 
more key is used in the encryption/decryption process. 
Communication using only the public key cryptography is not secure enough. 
Think of the scenario that if the public database storing the public keys is not 
secure enough. A hacker, Jacky, can crack into the database and replace the public 
key of Mary with his own public key. Then what Peter gets from the database in 
the previous example is Jacky's public key instead of Mary's public key. In this 
way, Jacky can intercept the messages sent from Peter to Mary and decrypt them 
easily with his own private key. Because of this drawback, digital certificate is 
used to verify the validity of a public key. 
1.3.2 Digital Certificate 
Digital Certificate is an electronic file used for the verification of a person identity 
in the computer world. Digital Certificate makes it possible to verify "who claims 
to be"; it can be used to prove the right of a person to use a given key. 
The digital certificate must conform to a well-established global standard. The 
current most widely accepted standard is the CCITT X.509. Applications that need 
to write and read such digital certificate must also compatible to the X.509 
standard. Typically, a digital certificate contains the following items: 
^ Name of the owner 
• Email of the owner 
i=> Public key of the owner 
"=> Name of the Certificate Authority (CA) 
Digital signature of the Certificate Authority 
^ Serial number of the certificate 
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^ Expiration date of the certificate 
Consider the communication scenario between Peter and Mary again. This 
time when Peter wants to send a message to Mary, what he needs to get is the 
digital certificate of Mary instead of her public key. However, this certificate can 
be a faked one made by some hackers. So Peter needs to check the expiration date 
of the certificate and validity of the CA's digital signature on the certificate by 
decrypting it with the CA's public key. If the signature is verified correct, then he 
know that the certificate is signed originally by the claimed CA. Peter can then get 
the Mary's public key from the digital certificate to encrypt the message to be sent. 
Peter _ _ _ J Encr-piion ^：^^^；^；；；^J Decrypuon ^ Mary read 
message ^^  \ the message � … “ T ™ ™ 
Mary public key 
Verification of L Mary 
Mary's digital private key 
certificate I , 
Figure 1.3: Digital Certificate 
1.3.3 One-way Hash Function 
A hash function is a function that converts a variable-length input string (called a 
pre-image) to a fixed-length output string (called a hash value). A one-way hash 
function is a hash function that works in one direction only. That means it is easy 
to compute a hash value of an input string, but it is computationally hard to obtain 
a pre-image that hashes to a particular value [14]. 
One-way hash function has been a popular element in cryptography. It has 
been widely used in message integrity check and digital signature construction. 
The commonly used one-way hash algorithms include MD5 (128-bit hash value) 
and SHA-1 (160-bit hash value). The longer the output hash value, the more 
robust is the hash function because it is then much more difficult to deduce the 
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pre-image from a given hash value. 
1.3.4 Digital Signature 
Digital Signature, similar to the traditional paper signature, is a mechanism for 
verifying the identity of a person. It has the added advantage over the paper 
signature that the receiver of the signed document can know whether the 
document has been modified after it is signed. 
For example, if Peter wants to send a document to Mary, Peter first generates a 
one-way hash value of the document; the generated hash value is then encrypted 
with Peter's private key. This has the effect of signing the document. After that, 
the encrypted hash value together with the original document is sent to Mary. 
Mary then uses Peter's public key to decrypt the received hash value. If the hash 
value can successfully be decrypted, Mary can assure that the document is signed 
by Peter because only Peter's public key can decrypt message signed by Peter's 
private key. To ensure that the document is not modified after signing by Peter, 
Mary can also generate a one-way hash value of the received document using the 
same hash function. If the generated hash value is the same as the decrypted hash 
value, she can assure that the document is not modified after signing by Peter. 
In the above example, the one-way hash value of the document is called the 
message digest. The encrypted message digest using a private key is the digital 
signature. Since the encryption is applied to the message digest directly, the digital 
signature is unique to the signed document. This can prevent the signature from 
being copied from one document to the others. 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
In Chapter 2, we present a review on the existing authentication and key 
establishment protocols, and the denial-of-service attack handling methods. 
Besides, the operations and handling methods of the common set of attacks on an 
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authentication and key establishment protocols will also be described. Chapter 3 
presents the structure of our proposed authentication and key establishment 
protocol. This authentication protocol involves an improved version of the client 
puzzle protocol of Juels and Brainard [15] for defending against DoS attacks. The 
defects in the Juels-Brainard's protocol will be identified and our improved client 
puzzle protocol will be described. These protocols rely on an authentication 
framework to operate. We will also present in this chapter the implementation 
details of this authentication framework and our proposed protocols. In Chapter 4, 
a thorough security analysis of our proposed authentication and key establishment 
protocol will be given. We will analyze informally the protocol against the set of 
attacks described in Chapter 2. We will also have a review in this chapter the 
existing formal protocol analysis methods and a formal analysis of our proposed 
protocol will then be given. Chapter 5 presents the results of a set of experiments 
carried on our proposed protocol and the analysis of these results while Chapter 6 




In this chapter, we will have a review on the previous notable authentication and 
key establishment protocols. There were quite different types of authentication 
and key establishment protocols proposed in the past. We will have a review on 
the design principals and the structures of these protocols. The strengths and the 
weaknesses of them will also be discussed. Besides, we will examine how strong 
is the current network protocols in defending against the denial-of-service attack 
and the different methods used to handle this famous attack in the past. In 
particular, the literature of the client puzzle based approach will be described. 
Finally, we will also have a review on how the current common set of security 
attacks on an authentication and key establishment protocol works. The basic 
methods for handling them will also be discussed. 
2.2 Authentication and Key Establishment Protocols 
In the past few decades, there were many different authentication and key 
establishment protocols and schemes proposed. Some famous protocols, such as 
the Needham-Schroeder protocol, the Kerberos protocol, and the Diffie-Hellman 
key agreement scheme, have led to active discussions in this research area for 
11 
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years. In this section, we will have a review on the operations, strengths and 
weaknesses of these representative authentication and key establishment protocols. 
The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Authentication Protocol [12] is one of 
the earliest authentication protocols proposed in the authentication literature. The 
proposal of this protocol has received active discussions in the past two decades. 
Many researchers have been able to point out errors in the protocol [11] [16] [17]. 
The Needham-Schroeder protocol consists of seven message exchanges among 
three entities: the two communicating entities and an authentication server. Before 
the start of the protocol session, the two communicating entities possess the public 
key of the authentication server. In the first four message exchanges, the two 
communicating entities employ this public key to request and obtain each other's 
public keys from the authentication server. In the last three message exchanges, 
the two communicating entities use the public key obtained to exchange secret 
nonces, which can be used for further secure communication. A well-known flaw 
in the protocol reveals that the protocol is vulnerable to the replay attack. This is 
because the two communicating entities in the protocol cannot be sure of the 
freshness of the messages received from the authentication server in the initial 
public key requests. This allows an attacker to employ an old message to cheat the 
communicating entities in a protocol session. 
Woo and Lam [18] proposed a mutual authentication protocol in 1994，which 
is an enhanced version of an erroneous one-way authentication protocol proposed 
by them previously [19]. Like the Needham-Schroeder authentication protocol, 
the Woo-Lam authentication protocol also involves two communicating entities 
and an authentication server, which together provide the functions of mutual 
authentication and session key establishment. The key establishment function of 
the protocol relies heavily on the use of shared keys, which need to be established 
through some secure channels before the start of the protocol session. The shared 
key approach was widely used in the past in the design of authentication and key 
establishment protocols because it allows the use of symmetric cryptography, 
which has a higher computational performance than the asymmetric counterpart. 
The Woo-Lam authentication protocol requires seven message exchanges among 
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the entities in order to complete a protocol session. In the first two message 
exchanges, the two communicating entities A and B exchange their respective 
secret nonces Na and Nb, The initiator A then encrypts the two nonces and the 
identities of A and B using kAs, the shared key with the authentication server S, 
and sent the encryption output to B in the third message exchange. Entity B 
produces a similar encryption output but with the shared key kss- Both of these 
encryption outputs are sent by B to the authentication server in the fourth message 
exchange. In the last three message exchanges, the authentication server gives the 
session key kAB to A and B. After the two communicating entities showing to each 
other the knowledge of this key, the protocol session finishes. In this mutual 
authentication protocol, Woo and Lam have introduced the Principal of Full 
Information. They said that 
‘‘An authentication protocol is said to be full information if its initiator and 
responder include in every outgoing encrypted message all of the information 
each has gathered so far in the authentication exchange." 
Woo and Lam claimed that by making an authentication protocol to be full 
information, it could be more resistant to attacks. However, Lowe [20] can still 
identify defects in the full information version of their enhanced authentication 
protocol. Lowe found that the Woo-Lam protocol is vulnerable to the replay attack. 
An attacker is able to replay part of an old message 4 as part of a fresh message 5 
in the protocol. Lowe also pointed out that the BAN logic [11], which is a famous 
protocol analysis method that will be discussed in Chapter 4, couldn't detect this 
defect of the Woo-Lam authentication protocol. 
Kerberos [21] [22] is another famous network authentication protocol 
originally developed at MIT. It is based on the model of the Needham-Schroeder 
protocol. The principal behind Kerberos is that the client and the server do not 
necessary trust each other, but both machines trust a Kerberos Key Distribution 
Center (KDC). Kerberos provides a system of encrypted messages called tickets, 
which securely establish trust between two machines on a network. These tickets 
are timestamp-based in order to prevent replay attack. Whenever a client wants to 
access resources of a server, it requests a ticket from the KDC. The client then 
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presents this ticket and an authenticator to the server. If the identity of the client is 
verified correct, the server authorizes the client the requested resources. 
The requirement of clock synchronization has been an important limitation of 
Kerberos as accurate clock synchronization is indeed difficult to achieve in actual 
implementation. Besides, Kerberos by default uses Data Encryption Standard 
(DES) symmetric key encryption, which is no longer considered to be a secure 
encryption algorithm. Kerberos v5 allows for stronger encryption algorithms like 
Triple-DES, which is much more preferred. 
KryptoKnight [23] is an authentication protocol similar to Kerberos. Same as 
Kerberos, KryptoKnight is also a secret-key based authentication and key 
distribution protocol. However, KryptoKnight is more flexible than Kerberos after 
some improvements. When compared with the Kerberos protocol, KryptoKnight 
has the following three improvements [14]: (i) KryptoKnight uses a hash function 
for authentication and encryption of tickets, thus it has a better computational 
performance than Kerberos. (ii) KryptoKnight uses nonces instead of timestamps 
for challenges, so no synchronized clocks are needed, (iii) Both of the 
communicating entities may also initiate the protocol session. Although the two 
protocols are very similar, the KryptoKnight protocol is usually employed to 
provide network security at a lower level in a system while the Kerberos approach 
is more appropriate to be used at the application level. 
Similar to the Kerberos scheme, the authentication protocol proposed by Shieh, 
Yang and Sun [24] also relies on an information center for the distribution of 
secret information. Every time a new user registers, the center generates a set of 
secret and public parameters for the new user. So before the start of the protocol, a 
secure channel not involving the public network is needed to deliver the secret 
information. Besides, this protocol employs timestamps to handle replay attack, 
the user claimed that the replay attack can still be detected even the system clocks 
of the communicating entities are out of synchronization. However, a method to 
determine whether the system clocks have been out of synchronized, which can be 
a difficult issue, is needed in order for this scheme to be workable. 
Recently, the Diffie-Hellman [25] authenticated key agreement scheme has 
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been widely used in the design of authentication and key agreement protocol. The 
Ham-Lin [26] protocol is one of the examples. However, Yen and Joye [27] was 
able to find an attack on this protocol. In 1999, Seo and Sweeney [28] proposed a 
simple authenticated key agreement algorithm based on the Diffie-Hellman key 
agreement protocol to provide user authentication. This protocol has the 
disadvantage that the communicating entities are required to pre-share a secret 
before the start of the protocol session. Tseng [29] pointed out that the session key 
verification process in this protocol is erroneous and solution was proposed. Ku 
and Wang [30] later performed a cryptanalysis on Tseng's solution and further 
enhancement was made to the Seo-Sweeney protocol. 
In 2000, Hwang and Li [31] developed a smart card based authentication 
scheme. The security of this authentication protocol relied on the difficulty of 
discrete logarithms over finite fields. This protocol has the advantage of not 
requiring a password table. However, it has been shown to be breakable by Chan 
and Cheng [32] using the impersonation attack. 
2.3 Denial-of-Service Attacks Handling Methods 
In this section, we will examine a number of existing network protocols for 
defending against denial-of-service attacks. Different approaches have been 
proposed in the past to handle such subtle attacks, e.g. the stateless connection 
approach, the cookies approach and the client puzzle approach. We examine in 
this section the usage and operation of each of them. Among these methods, the 
client puzzle scheme is one of the most effective approaches. 
TCP connection protocol was reported to be vulnerable to SYN flooding attack 
in 1996 [33]. This is one of the well-known DoS attacks against a network 
protocol. During the attack, the attacker sends a huge number of SYN messages to 
the server to initialize connections and then leaves the subsequently established 
connections unattended. Since the server allocates buffer space right after the 
reception of a SYN message, memory of the server can thus easily be exhausted 
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by such connection requests. Juels and Brainard [15] pointed out that the SSL 
protocol [34] is vulnerable to a similar form of attack. However, it is the CPU 
resource rather than the memory space, which could be exhausted rapidly because 
expensive cryptographic operations are required on the server-side in the SSL 
protocol. 
Entity authentication has long been used in communication protocols to tackle 
different attacks, such as the man-in-the-middle attack, denial-of-service attack, 
etc. Authentication based on the public-key infrastructure is computationally 
expensive, as the underlying cryptographic operations such as modular 
exponentiation involve extensive computations. An attacker may be able to 
exhaust the computational or memory resources of its target if the underlying 
authentication or communication protocol has been designed improperly. For 
instance, Ng and Tan's protocol [35] is one that is vulnerable to the resource 
consumption attack; the server is required to perform public-key decryption right 
after the reception of the client request message in this protocol. There are several 
other protocols identified as being vulnerable to this type of attack [36] [37] [38]. 
Cookies could also be used to formulate solutions against the network denial-
of-service attack. A cookie would be generated and sent to the client by the server 
in response to a client request. The client must include the cookie in subsequent 
messages to assure the server of its identity. The cookie approach assumes the 
attackers unable to capture messages sent to spoofed IP addresses, so that the 
attackers cannot return the cookie in subsequent messages. However, message 
interception is relatively easy especially within an internal network. ISAKMP [39] 
is a key management protocol employing cookies to prevent IP spoofing and TCP 
SYN attacks. However, this protocol has been identified as vulnerable to denial-
of-service attack and has been criticized for its improper usage of server resources 
[40] [41]. Kam and Simpson [42] later proposed Photuris, a simpler but stronger 
scheme with cookies, which is able to avoid the defects in ISAKMP. 
Aura and Nikander [43] generalizes the concept of stateless connection to 
prevent resource exhaustion, and introduces the transformation of stateful 
protocols to stateless ones. The saving of state information can be avoided by 
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attaching the state data to the messages sent to the client; and the state data is 
expected to be returned to the server in subsequent messages. The cost of this 
technique is the additional communication bandwidth required to transfer the state 
data between the client and the server. Also, Aura and Nikander have admitted 
that the presented technique has the problem of not being able to detect replayed 
messages. 
Dwork and Naor [44] first introduced the concept of client puzzle to combat 
junk mail attack. A client puzzle is a small cryptographic problem created by the 
server in response to a client request. The client should first commit its resources 
to solving the puzzle before completing the remaining part of the communication 
protocol. While the legitimate users could experience only a slight degradation of 
service under this scheme, a big cost will be imposed on a denial-of-service 
attacker who tends to create a huge number of requests within a short duration, 
because the attacker is required to solve a unique puzzle for each of its service 
requests. Unlike the cookie approach, client puzzle does not assume the inability 
of the attacker to capture messages sent to spoofed IP addresses. With appropriate 
adjustment on the puzzle difficulty level, the client puzzle method can handle 
relatively fast attacks and allow for graceful service degradation. Aura, Nikander 
and Lei wo [45] proposed a client puzzle and applied it to an authentication 
protocol. The authentication protocol has two operation modes. In one mode, the 
puzzle is broadcast by the server to all possible clients of the protocol; this creates 
unnecessary network traffic. In the second mode, the server is required to produce 
a public-key based signature after the reception of a hello request message from a 
client; this makes the protocol vulnerable to denial-of-service attack as public-key 
operations are computationally expensive. Besides, the client puzzle used has an 
inherent problem that the solution to a puzzle may not exist since the protocol 
does not verify the existence of a solution during puzzle construction. A later 
authentication protocol designed also by Leiwo, Nikander and Aura [46] employs 
a puzzle without the above problem. However, similar to the approach proposed 
by Matsuura and Imai [38], the puzzle does not have a difficulty level; so graceful 
degradation of service would not be possible. The authentication protocol is also 
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vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks because the puzzle is not created in a 
stateless way. Juels and Brainard [15] from the RSA Laboratories proposed a 
client puzzle protocol to address the TCP SYN attack. This client puzzle protocol 
does not have the above-mentioned problems; however, we will show in Chapter 
3 that there are still other identified defects in this protocol. 
As can be seen, the denial-of-service attack is generally ignored in the design 
of the network protocols in the past. The different approaches for handling the 
denial-of-service attack are also weak in certain aspects. In this thesis, a public-
key based authentication and key establishment protocol integrated with a client 
puzzle protocol would be proposed. We will demonstrate how the proposed 
integrated authentication protocol can resist effectively the network DoS attacks 
and other types of common attacks. 
2.4 Attacks on Authentication and Key Establishment 
Protocol 
In this section, we review a number of common attacks on an authentication and 
key establishment protocol. Although there are many different types of attacks 
identified in the past, not all of them are applicable to an authentication and key 
establishment protocol. In this thesis, we will only concentrate on those attacks on 
an authentication and key establishment protocol [14] [47] [48]. 
Typically, a protocol attack can be classified into one of the two categories: 
active attacks or passive attacks [14]. In an active attack, the attacker takes an 
active role in the protocol. It may intercept and modify the protocol messages, 
delete and insert its own new messages in order to subvert the protocol session. In 
a passive attack, the attacker will only eavesdrop on a protocol session in order to 
obtain the target information. It does not corrupt the protocol session like what an 
active attack does. In the following sub-sections, we review how the attacks work 
and the methods to defend against such attacks in the design of an authentication 
and key establishment protocol. 
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2.4.1 Denial-of-Service Attack 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack is characterized by an explicit attempt of the 
attackers to prevent legitimate users of a service from using that service [48]. 
There has been a growing concern about this attack in recent years, especially 
after the series of denial-of-service attacks on the Internet in February 2000 [49]. 
Denial-of-Service attacks can be classified into three types, including (i) 
consumption of scarce resources; (ii) destruction or alteration of configuration 
information; and (iii) physical destruction or alteration of network components 
[48]. A poorly designed authentication protocol can easily suffer from the resource 
consumption attack, i.e. the first type of DoS attack above. In this thesis, we will 
concentrate on the handling of this type of DoS attack. Actually, any protocol 
where the server commits extensive computations or memory allocation prior to 
or as part of the client authentication is vulnerable to the network DoS attacks [46], 
which corresponds to the first type of DoS attack above. One of the strategies to 
handle the denial-of-service attack is that the server should require the client to 
commit its resources before committing extensive resources to the client by the 
server in an authentication protocol session. 
2.4.2 Replay Attack 
A replay attack is one in which an intruder intercepts and replays the exchanged 
messages between two communicating entities in order to impersonate either or 
both of the entities involved. Consider the mutual authentication protocol as 
depicted in figure 2.1. For a message M, with x and ；y being the private keys of A 
and B respectively, this protocol could be used to authenticate the two entities to 
each other without error. 
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Figure 2.1: An authentication protocol vulnerable to the replay attack. 
However, if the response message Ey{M} is intercepted by an attacker X. He 
can impersonate the identity of B by just replaying this message to A without 
knowing B's private key, as illustrated in figure 2.2. Similarly, attacker X can 
impersonate A if E^{M} is intercepted and replayed. 
A w w w X 
^ E J M } 
timeline 
Figure 2.2: Replay attack. 
Typically, a replay attack can be prevented by the use of a timestamp or a 
nonce. However, a preliminary requirement of the timestamp method is the clock 
synchronization between the communicating entities. Clock synchronization can 
be difficult to achieve. Once clock synchronization has been achieved, it can be 
out of synchronization again in the future; and re-synchronization is required. If 
the timestamp function used relies on an external time source, an additional 
authentication of the time source may be required, which involves additional 
overhead to the overall authentication process. Moreover, since the clocks cannot 
be perfectly synchronized, we usually need to set a tolerance for the clock 
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difference between the communicating entities. If this tolerance difference is not 
properly set, a security threat could be created to the underlying system. Because 
of the inherent clock synchronization problem, a nonce-based method is more 
preferable in the handling of the replay attack. 
2.4.3 Man-in-the middle Attack 
I 
Man-in-the-middle attack is an active attack in which the attacker intercepts and 
modifies the messages exchanged between a client and a server. The target is to 
cheat the client and the server into thinking that they are communicating with 
each other normally, but in fact, the attacker is acting in between and listening all 
the traffic exchanged between them. As depicted in figure 2.3, the client is 
actually communicating with a fake server impersonated by the attacker. The 
server is also communicating directly with a fake client impersonated by the same 
attacker. However, the client and the server believe that they are communicating 
directly without any entity in between. 
Fake Fake 
Server Client 
B 吟 , 〒 、 丨 l i i 
Client Attacker ^OODOODa|>^ 
Server 
Figure 2.3: Man-in-the-Middle Attack 
An example of this attack is the one on the unauthenticated Diffie-Hellman 
key agreement protocol. In the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, the two 
communicating entities A and B possess a public value w. Each of them generates 
a random private value. Let call them a and b for entity A and B respectively. A 
and B then exchange their w^ as shown in figure 2.4 below. Normally, A and B can 
then establish the shared key w办“ and w “ � = v/“）respectively at this time. 
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However, if under the man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker X will intercept the 
from A and w^ from B, replace them with v / and w^ respectively. The attacker 
now has the shared keys with both A and B. Whenever A sends a message 
encrypted with the shared key to B, the attacker can intercept and decrypt it, 
modify the content and encrypt it again before sending it to B. The messages send 
by 5 to A can be tampered in the same way. 
A , _ _ ^ X , _ _ B 
炉 ^ .y. ^ • 
一 ， _ _ ( 一 一 一 
Figure 2.4: Man-in-the-middle attack on the Diffie-Hellman protocol 
The problem of this example is that there is no entity authentication in the 
protocol. Actually, this attack can be handled easily by the use of the certificate-
based public-key signature mechanism [28] in order to provide the authentication 
function. 
2.4.4 Chosen-text Attack 
The chosen-text attack can be classified into two types: chosen-plaintext attack 
and chosen-ciphertext attack. In the chosen-plaintext attack, the attacker submits a 
chosen plaintext to a normal entity, asking it for the corresponding ciphertext, 
which requires the entity's secret encryption key to produce. The chosen-
ciphertext works in a similar way; the attacker submits a chosen ciphertext to an 
entity, asking for the corresponding plaintext, which requires the entity's secret 
decryption key to produce. 
An authentication protocol tends to suffer from this attack whenever a 
plaintext message is transmitted in one direction from entity A to entity B, while 
the enciphered version is transmitted in the other direction from B to A. Consider 
the authentication protocol shown in figure 2.5, where N1 and N2 are the nonces 
； 
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used to prevent replay attacks. The plain N1 is transmitted from A to 5 in flow 1 
while its enciphered version E{N1} is transmitted from 5 to A in flow 2. Similarly, 
the plain N2 is transmitted from 5 to A in flow 2 while E{N2} is transmitted from 
A to B in flow 3. Under this design, an attacker can submit a chosen plaintext N1 
to entity B and B will then return the encrypted Nl, E{N1}. Besides, by 
intercepting all those challenge-response messages between two normal entities in 
this protocol, an attacker can also get the pairs (Nl, E{N1}) and (N2, E{N2}). So 
by launching the chosen-text attack, an attacker can obtain a large set of plaintext-
ciphertext pair, which may allow the attacker to figure out useful information of 
the secret keys after further analysis. 
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Figure 2.5: An authentication protocol vulnerable to the chosen-text attack 
The typical method to handle the chosen-text attack is to embed in each 
challenge response message a self-chosen random number [47]. This makes the 
attacker unable to obtain a plaintext-ciphertext pair from the protocol sessions as 
the content of the ciphertext has been randomized. 
2.4.5 Interleaving Attack 
Interleaving attacks involve selective combination of information from one or 
more previous or simultaneously ongoing protocol executions (parallel sessions), 
including possible origination of one or more protocol executions by an adversary 
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Figure 2.6: An authentication protocol vulnerable to the interleaving attack. 
The authentication protocol shown in figure 2.6 is one that is vulnerable to the 
interleaving attack. In this protocol, entity A sends a plain nonce N1 to B in the 
first message in order to start the protocol session. Entity B is required to encrypt 
this N1 using its own private key b. The encryption output Eb{N2, Nl, A} together 
with its own nonce N2 are returned to A in message 2. Entity A then performs the 
similar encryption. The output and a new nonce N3, which is different from its 
previous nonce Nl, are again sent back to B in the third message. In this protocol, 
an attacker is able to impersonate the identity of A to start a protocol session with 
B. Consider the scenario in figure 2.7, the attacker X initiates a session with B 
using the nonce Nl, However, as the attacker does not know the private key of A, 
it cannot produce the third message (flow 5) required by B, it then initiates 
another session with A using the nonce N2 obtained from B. Entity A will then 
return what the attacker need in flow 4. The attacker can then pass back this 
message to B in flow 5 and finish the session with B. 
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Figure 2.7: Interleaving Attack 
In order to prevent the interleaving attack, all the messages from a protocol 
session should be linked together using, e.g. chained nonces [47]. Or the structure 
of the messages should be different from each other. For example, one of the 
reasons the above protocol is vulnerable to the interleaving attack is that the 
messages in flows 2 and 5 are too similar in structure. This allows the attacker to 
employ a second message from a session as the third message in another session 
like that in the above example. 
2.4.6 Reflection Attack 
Reflection attack is an attack in which the attacker returns the information from an 
entity directly back to the entity without modifications. Consider the protocol in 
figure 2.8; it is a protocol vulnerable to the reflection attack. In this protocol, the 
communicating entities possess a shared key before the start of the protocol 
session. The two entities are required to show to the entity on the other side the 
knowledge of this secret key. Initially, A sends B its nonce Nl, asking B to encrypt 
it with the shared key. Similarly, B sends A its encrypted nonce E{N2}, together 
with the encrypted Nl, asking A to decrypt it with their shared key. If the Nl 
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received in flow 2 and the N2 received in flow 3 are correct, then A knows that B 
possesses the expected shared key and vice versa. 
A B 
N1 1、 • (Flow 1) 
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N2 
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Figure 2.8: An authentication protocol vulnerable to the reflection attack. 
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Figure 2.9: Reflection Attack 
However, an attacker is able to impersonate the identity of B by applying the 
reflection attack on this protocol. In the attack scenario shown in figure 2.9, the 
dashed lines shown those reflected messages sent by the attacker X. In flow 1 of 
the protocol session, the attacker receives the nonce from A. It is required to 
perform an encryption using a key unknown to it. So in order to obtain the 
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required encryption output E{N2, Nl), the attacker initiates another protocol 
session with A by reflecting the received Nl. Entity A interprets that an entity 
wants to start a new session with it, so it returns exactly what the attacker needed 
in flow 3. After obtaining what it wants, the attacker reflects this E{N2, Nl] in 
flow 4 in order to finish its part in the previous session with A. After A sending the 
N2 to X in flow 5, the first session is finished and the attacker successes in 
impersonating the identity of B. 
In order to prevent the reflection attack, some mechanisms are needed to make 
the protocol messages asymmetric to each other. One of the methods is to use 
different keys for each direction of the message exchanges. This makes the 
attacker unable to reflect a message received in one direction back to the 
originator in another direction because the keys used are the same. Another 
method is to include in the challenge response messages the identity of the sender. 
This makes the source and the corresponding reflected messages having the same 
sender identity, which is invalid. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the strengths and weaknesses of existing authentication and key 
establishment protocols are reviewed. Different schemes were used in the design 
of authentication and key establishment protocols. For example, pre-shared keys 
were commonly used for symmetric cryptography in a protocol session and key 
distribution server was usually employed as a third party for the generation and 
distribution of session key. Besides, previous network protocols including the 
famous SSL protocol were reviewed for its resistance to the denial-of-service 
attack. We found that these protocols are generally weak in handling the denial-of-
service attack. A number of methods were employed in the past to handle the 
denial-of-service attack. These include the PKI-based authentication, cookies, 
stateless connections, and the client puzzles. Among them, we advocated the 
usage of the client puzzle approach in the handling of the denial-of-service attack. 
Chapter 2 Related Work 28 
Finally, the common attacks, which include the denial-of-service attack, the replay 
attack, the man-in-the-middle attack, the chosen-text attack, the interleaving 
attack, and the reflection attack on an authentication and key establishment 
protocol and their handling methods were also described. 
Chapter 3 
A DoS-resistant Authentication and 
Key Establishment Protocol 
3.1 Introduction 
From the reviews in the previous chapter, we have seen that the existing 
authentication and network protocols are generally weak in handling DoS attacks. 
In this Chapter, a DoS-resistant Authentication and Key Establishment Protocol 
50] [51] is proposed. This proposed mutual authentication and key establishment 
protocol is a challenge-response and timestamp-based authentication protocol. 
Though a timestamp parameter is employed in the protocol, clock synchronization 
is not required. This authentication protocol has incorporated the concept of client 
puzzle to resist the network DoS attacks. Apart from authentication protocol, this 
client puzzle can also be incorporated with other network protocols to enhance 
their DoS-resistance. The proposed protocol cannot execute by itself; we will also 
describe the structure of a testing authentication framework in which the protocol 
can operate. Then a number of implementation issues of the proposed protocol 
will be described. We will talk about the set of software packages and 
programming tools used in the implementation, the message formats of the 
protocol and the interfaces. Finally, the implementation of the puzzle difficulty 
level calculation will also be explained. 
29 
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3.2 Protocol Notations 
Let kz denote the public key of the entity Z and k^^ denote the corresponding 
private key. The encryption of a message w using the key k � i s denoted by 
E{w}k2：. In addition, A^^'denotes a random nonce generated by entity C and S 
denote respectively the unique identities of the client and the server; h denotes a 
one-way and collision-resistant hash function. Let r be the current date and time 
according to the server clock; and 5 be a secret key held by the server. Also, we 
denote by z<ij> the 产 to / " bits of a bit-string z. 
3.3 Protocol Descriptions 
The proposed authentication protocol consists of 4 message exchanges between 
the client and the server. It is assumed that the communicating entities have 
authentic copies of all the required public keys. The authentication protocol 
begins with client C sending an authentication request message to the server S. 
Message 1: C S : C 
In message 1 of the proposed authentication protocol, client identity C is used as 
the only parameter to formulate the authentication request. It serves as a hello 
message only; and does not trigger the execution of expensive computations or the 
allocation of memory resources by the server. Otherwise, the protocol is 
vulnerable to DoS attacks. 
After the reception of the client request, the server then checks the availability 
of system resources in order to determine the difficulty level k of the client puzzle 
to be sent out. The resource availability may refer to the availability of memory or 
CPU resource or both. Normally, the difficulty level is inversely proportional to 
the availability of the system resources, allowing a graceful degradation of 
services during the denial-of-service attacks. In a normal situation, k is set to zero, 
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and no puzzle needs to be solved by the clients. 
If the server determines that a client puzzle needs to be distributed (i.e. k * 0)， 
then a client puzzle would be constructed using two one-way, collision-resistant 
hash operations. First, a bit-string z\ is generated by the hash operation h(�C’ s  t), 
where the hash function h would operate on a single input bit-string formed by the 
concatenation of the parameters C, s and t. Then a second hash operation is 
performed on zl to produce another bit-string z2. The client identity C is included 
in the hash input to make the puzzle client specific so that the solution found by 
client C for a given puzzle cannot be used by other clients. Parameter s is the 
server secret key, which should be long enough (e.g. 128 bits) to prevent brute 
force attacks. In order to impose a limit time for solving the puzzle by the client, 
the puzzle should be associated with a timestamp, t, which is set to the current 
date and time with a precision up to a second. The client needs to solve the puzzle 
before it expires; otherwise, the protocol execution will be terminated no matter 
whether the returned solution is correct or not. 
Assume the hash output is of length L bits. The construction of the puzzle, 
which is made up of the hash image z2, the partial pre-image L>, the 
timestamp t and the difficulty level k, can be depicted in figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1: Client puzzle construction, where is a hash function 
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In this way, the puzzle can be constructed in a totally stateless fashion. It is 
important to commit as little resource as possible in the construction of a puzzle 
because the DoS attackers intend to exhaust the server resources. 
If k is set to 0，no client puzzle needs to be distributed but the computation and 
distribution of zl would still be necessary. Since the bit-string zl encompasses the 
timestamp t, the sub-string zl<A:+l, L> can be used to validate the timestamp in 
message 3 later on the server side. So the bit-string zl<A:+l, L> is an important 
piece of data used to ensure message freshness for protection against replay 
attacks. 
Message 2: S — C: zl<k+l, L>, z2，t, k 
In message 2 of the protocol, the server passes the strings z\<k+l, L> and z2 (for 
A:类 0) together with the timestamp t and difficulty level k to the client. 
On reception of message 2, if the difficulty level is greater than zero, the client 
needs to solve the puzzle. Otherwise, no puzzle needs to be solved. 
To solve the puzzle, the client finds by brute force a k-hii string zV<\, k>, 
which, when concatenated with the given partial pre-image zl<k+l, L>, satisfies 
the following relation: 
z2 = h(zr<l, k>, zl<k+l, L>) 
1 k L 
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Figure 3.2: Client solving a given puzzle, where /i is a hash function 
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After solving the puzzle, the solution zV<l, k> together with the received 
parameters L>, t，k and the client identity C would be sent back to the 
server for verification. 
Message 3: C — S: zl’<l, k>, z\<k+l, L>, t, k, C, S, E呢ks, E{h(zr<l, k>, 
zUk+1，L>, t, k, C, S, E{Nc}ks)}kc^ 
From the above description, 丨<1’ k>, L>, t, k, C} is the message that 
needs to be passed to the server S in message 3 of the protocol. To authenticate the 
client to the server, the client produces a signature of the message using its private 
key, i.e. E{h(zV<l, k>, zl<k+l, L>, t, k, C, S)}kc^. We emphasize here that the 
plaintext counterpart, i.e. {zV<l, k>, zl<^+l, L>, t, k, C, S}, of this encryption 
must also be submitted to the server. Although the client can still authenticate to 
the server by sending only the encryption output E{zV<l, k>, zl<k-\-l, L>, t,k, C, 
S}kc-i, the server will then need to perform a computationally expensive public-
key decryption operation in order to retrieve the puzzle solution and the 
timestamp for verification. Denial-of-service attack can then be achieved by 
repetitively sending bogus encryption outputs to trigger the server executing the 
corresponding decryption operations. So the plaintext counterpart should also be 
submitted to allow the server to perform the necessary verifications (such as the 
client puzzle verification) before performing the expensive public-key decryption 
in order to authenticate the client and to verify the message integrity. 
For the sake of authentication and key establishment, a secret nonce Nc is 
randomly generated and sent to the server. The purpose of this nonce is twofold. 
First, it serves as a challenge to the server, which is to be returned in the next 
message. Second, it serves as a secret piece of data that forms part of the future 
session key. To protect the nonce from being revealed, it is encrypted using the 
server's public key (i.e. E{Nc}ks). This encrypted Nc is then signed using the 
client's private key to form E{h(E{Nc}ks)}kc\ This signature can be combined 
with the previous signature to form E{h(zV<l, k>, zl<k+l, L>, t, k, C, S, 
E{Nc}ks)}kc^- This encryption output together with its plaintext counterpart, i.e. 
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{zl,<l，k>, zl<A:+l, L>, t, K C, S, E{Nc}ks}, form the message that should be sent 
in the third message of the authentication protocol. 
On the server side, if k ^ 0, the server verifies the puzzle solution. Before 
verifying the puzzle solution, the server first checks the timestamp t to see if the 
puzzle has expired. If T is the maximum allowable time for the client to solve the 
puzzle and to return the solution, the server must ensure that r - t <T where r is 
the current date and time on server side. If the timestamp has not expired, the 
server performs a hash operation, which is the same hash operation used during 
puzzle construction, by using the client-submitted C and t to form the bit-string m 
=h(C, s, 0. The last L-k bits of this bit-string (i.e. m<k+l, L>) are compared with 
the received bit string L>, as depicted in figure 3.3, to make sure that the 
timestamp and the client identity are the same as the original ones. 
Client-submitted Cand t, «> 
Server secret key s 
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z1</c+1, L> — • < Equal? > ~ Y e s - > - Valid C 
No 
I 
Invalid C and/or t 
Figure 3.3: Client-submitted identity and timestamp validation, where is a hash 
function 
After that, the client-purported solution is verified by checking the equality of 
h{m) and the output from the hash operation on the string formed by the 
concatenation of zV<l, k> and m<k+l, L> as depicted in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.4: Puzzle solution verification, where is a hash function 
If the equality holds, the solution can be assured correct; the server can then 
commit its resources to the client such as spending the time to decrypt the 
encrypted string in message 3; otherwise the client request would be rejected. If k 
-0，no solution needs to be verified and the verification h{zV<l, k>, m<k+l, L>) 
=h(m) can be omitted. After that, the signature of the client would be verified to 
confirm the authenticity and integrity of the message. If the client is authentic, a 
secret nonce Ns, which will form part of the future session key, will be randomly 
generated for inclusion in message 4. 
The ability to prevent the use of a pre-computed puzzle solution is a basic 
puzzle design criterion. In the proposed authentication protocol, a timestamp t and 
a long server secret key s are the parameters used in creating the client puzzle. 
This makes the puzzle component zl<A:+l, L> unpredictable to the client; and so, 
the solution cannot be pre-computed. However, if the time parameter T is set too 
large, a client (or an attacker) can submit the same solution a number of times 
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before the puzzle expires. So the server should register the pair (C, t) in memory 
after the solution has been verified correct. This indicates that client C has 
submitted a correctly solved puzzle created at time t. Before verifying a given 
solution from any client C, the server should check the existing registered pairs to 
ensure that there is not any pair of the form (C, t) in memory for the client. This 
pair (C, t) does not need to be kept in memory for a long time; it can be removed 
once the puzzle has expired. In theory, upon verifying a given puzzle solution, if 
r -t = T, then no pair of the form (C, t) needs to be kept for client C. However, if 
r - r < r , the duration for which (C, t) needs to be stored is {T-( r - 0), which is 
usually a short period. 
Message 4 : 5 - > C : S, C, E{Nc}ksy E�Ns)kc, E{h{S, C，E{Nc\ks, E{Ns}kc)}ks^ 
The remaining tasks of the protocol are to authenticate the server to the client and 
to pass the client the two secret nonces Nc and Ns. Similar to message 3，the 
server secret nonce is encrypted using the client's public key (i.e. E{Ns}kc) to 
prevent it from being revealed. This encrypted nonce together with the challenge 
E{Nc}ks are signed by the server's private key in order to authenticate the server 
to the client. 
On the client side, if the signature on message 4 can be verified, then both 
parties would know the secret nonce of the other party. The session specific secret 
key can then be established by combining the two secret nonces Ns and No Since 
both entities contribute to the established session key and both Ns and Nc are 
randomly generated, none of them can predetermine the session key value. Figure 
3.5 shows the overall picture of the proposed authentication and key establishment 
protocol. We assume in figure 3.5 that a puzzle would be distributed and a 
solution would be produced and submitted by the client. If the submitted solution 
is incorrect, it will then be rejected and the protocol execution will be terminated. 
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Figure 3.5: The proposed public-key based authentication and key establishment 
protocol. 
3.4 Client Puzzle Protocols 
This section describes the client puzzle protocol being incorporated into the 
proposed authentication framework. The said client puzzle protocol is based 
mainly on the client puzzle protocol proposed by Juels and Brainard [15]. 
However, our client puzzle protocol manages to avoid the weaknesses inherent in 
the Juels-Brainard protocol so it can be considered as an improved version of the 
Juels-Brainard protocol. 
3.4.1 Review of Juels-Brainard Protocol 
Let Mi denote the /汝 execution of the protocol M which the Juels-Brainard 
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protocol intends to defend, and Mf denote the d仇 message sent in the 产 execution 
of M. The flows of the protocol can be structured as follows: 
I C ^ S\ Mi Puzzler 
In the first flow of the protocol, client C sends M/ and a query to ask whether 
server S is distributing puzzles. 
ii. S-^C: ”No puzzle'' or ''Yes, puzzle”, P, t 
In the second flow, the server returns "No puzzle” to the client if it is not 
distributing puzzles. Otherwise, it sends a ''Yes, puzzle” response together with the 
puzzle P and the puzzle creation time t. The puzzle P is made up of u (> 1) sub-
puzzle(s). To create the f sub-puzzle P\j], the server computes a bit-string x\j] as 
h{s, t, m/, j), where " is a one-way hash function with an output length I，and s is 
the server secret seed which is long enough to prevent brute force attacks. The 
authors emphasized that h is not required to be collision-resistant. The bit-string 
xlj] is hashed in turn to produce another bit-string y\j] = h(x\j]). The sub-puzzle 
P[j] consists of the bit-strings y\j] and xlj]<k+l, />, the (k+lf to f bits of x\jl 
Under this scheme, k and u serve as the difficulty levels of the puzzle P. 
i i i . { x { n < h k > ] ) ^ , , M i j 
The message in flow 3 is the solution to the puzzle sent in the previous flow. If the 
”No puzzle'' response is sent in the previous flow, the server and the client can 
begin the protocol execution Mi starting from the current flow. To solve a puzzle P 
correctly, the client needs to solve all the sub-puzzles P[/] correctly. To solve a 
sub-puzzle the client finds by brute force the k missing bits of i.e. x[/]<l, 
k> satisfying y\j] = h{x\jY). After solving all the sub-puzzles, the u solutions 
[x[j] <l,k along with m/ and t are sent back to the server for verification. 
iv. C ^ S : Mi 
Before verifying the solution of puzzle P, the server first checks that the puzzle 
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has not expired, to ensure the t- t <T condition being satisfied, where tis the 
current time and T is time limit for a client to solve and submit a client puzzle. 
Then the server computes the set {z[j] = h(s,t, MI, and compares the k 
leading bits of each z[/] against the corresponding client-purported sub-puzzle 
solution jc[/] in the set {x[j]<l,k in order to verify the solution of the 
whole puzzle P. If the puzzle solution can be finally verified, the client and server 
can start the execution of protocol Mi. 
3.4.2 Weaknesses of Juels-Brainard Protocol and Proposed 
Improvements 
In the Juels-Brainard protocol, the authors claim that a collision-resistant hash 
function is not a requirement. However, their solution verification process does 
not take this claim into account. A given sub-puzzle solution, x[j]<l, k> is said to 
be correct only if it is equal to the k leading bits of the server-generated bit-string 
z[/] = h{s, t, Mi\ j). However, a non-collision-resistant hash function means that 
apart from zljl there could be another z'[/] satisfying the equation y\j] = h(zV])-
So the Juels-Brainard protocol could treat a correct solution as wrong. 
To overcome this problem, we suggest replacing the k leading bits of the 
server-generated bit-string zlj] by the client-purported solution x[j]<l, k> to form 
a bit-string z'lj] as depicted in figure 3.6. 
1 k L 
4/1 
V 、 ) 
C l i e n t - p u r p o r t e d ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ z</c+i,L> 
solution 
V " '''''' , ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ '7' 
Y 
‘ ' ,,，、、’,*、 V - 、、 、 
Figure 3.6: Formation of z'[/] 
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The client-purported solution jc[/]<l, k> is said to be correct if /i(z'[/]) = y\j\. 
With this modification, a correct solution will not be marked as incorrect even if a 
non-collision-resistant hash function is used because a correct solution would 
always be hashed to y\j]. This modification would also be useful when using a 
collision-resistant hash function because collision-resistance is not a guaranteed 
property. Collisions could still occur in some hash functions claimed to be 
collision-resistant [52]. 
Another weakness of the Juels-Brainard protocol is the possibility of treating 
an old puzzle as a new one. Consider the case with the puzzle difficulty level k 
and u both equal to 1. After solving the puzzle, instead of submitting the solution 
immediately, the client stores the solution for later use. Suppose after the puzzle 
has expired, the client retrieves the solution from storage and submits it. The 
client knows that the server could possibly reject the solution as the puzzle has 
expired. So, before submission, it updates the timestamp t in order to cheat the 
server. On the server side, the 1-bit solution is computed using this fake 
timestamp, and is then compared with the client-purported solution. Although the 
timestamp has been modified, the probability of producing the same 1-bit solution 
as the client-purported one is still very high. The problem is that the solution is 
very short. In this example, this probability is 1/2. In general, this probability is 
1/2^". We can see that the lower the value of ku, the more severe would be the 
problem. So one possible solution is to set a bigger lower bound for ku. However, 
this makes graceful degradation of service difficult and the clients will experience 
a large degradation of service quality in a short time at the beginning of a potential 
DoS attack. 
To overcome this problem, we suggest the client to submit, for a given sub-
puzzle j, both the solution x[/]<l, Jo and the bit-string x\j]<k+l, l> received in 
flow 2 of the protocol. Before verifying the solution, the server should check 
whether the received bit-string x[j]<k+l, l> matches the server-computed bit-
string z[i]<k+l, l> to ensure that the timestamp has not been changed. Among the 
possible values of zlj], 2众 of them have the sub-string z[j]<k+l, l> matching the 
given x\j]<k+l, l>. Assume the hash outputs are uniformly distributed. The 
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probability of producing a bit-string z[/], using the fake timestamp, with the last l-
k bits (i.e. zlj]<k+l, />) matching the client-submitted l> is 1/2"气 
According to this probability 1/2"气 the higher the value of k, the higher would be 
the chance of the matching when the modified timestamp is being used to 
generate the bit-string z[/]. To make this probability close to zero so that the 
chance of matching z[/]<A:+l, l> and x[j]<k+l, l> would become negligible, we 
suggest the value of k to be between 0 and 1/2; and I should have a length of at 
least 128 bits. In fact, the current common hash functions such as MD5 and SHA-
1 have a hash output with a length not less than 128 bits. 
Before a puzzle expires, it is possible for a client to submit the same solution a 
number of times, leading to multiple allocations of server resources. In Juels-
Brainard protocol, it has mechanism to prevent multiple allocations of buffer 
resources. This is done by associating a unique identifier derived from M/ to the 
corresponding allocated buffer slot; and the server ensures that only one buffer 
slot would be allocated for each request m/. However, the authors assume the 
unavailability of PKI in the design of their protocol because they claimed that PKI 
could effectively prevent connection depletion or other denial-of-service attacks; 
and so no additional benefits can be achieved in using client puzzle in the 
presence of PKI. Nevertheless, this is not true because the computationally 
expensive operations such as modular exponentiation in PKI can open up the CPU 
exhaustion attack. The client puzzle protocol could in fact be used to protect a 
public-key based authentication protocol. In this case, after verifying the puzzle 
solution, the server may need to perform the expensive public-key cryptographic 
operations in executing the subsequent authentication protocol. That is exactly the 
situation in our proposed authentication and key establishment protocol. 
To prevent CPU exhaustion attack, we suggest adding a step to check for the 
non-existence of an identifier that is unique to each service request before 
verifying the puzzle solution. The message m/ only needs to contain the client 
identity C in our case. Other equivalent protocol-specific parameters can also be 
used when used in other type of network protocols. The unique identifier can be 
derived from C, which appears in the first request message, and the puzzle 
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timestamp t, which is generated by the server having a precision of at least up to a 
second, to form the unique pair (C, t). This mechanism can reduce the number of 
parameters in the client request message to a minimal. To allow for a rapid search 
for the existence of an identifier, bucket hashing on the identifiers could be 
employed. If the existence of a submitted identifier (C, t) is found, the protocol 
should terminate immediately and both CPU and memory resources are not 
allocated. If the client submits a fake (C, t), it cannot pass the subsequent solution 
verification. Whenever a solution has been verified correct, the unique pair (C, t) 
is stored in memory until the corresponding puzzle expires. Therefore, if a client 
(or attacker) reuses the same solution before the puzzle expires, the solution will 
be rejected. Thus multiple allocations of both extensive CPU and memory 
resources would not occur. 
3.4.3 Improved Client Puzzle Protocol 
In the Juels-Brainard protocol, a puzzle can be made up of u (> 1) sub-puzzle(s) 
each having the same difficulty level k. The probability of guessing, by an attacker, 
the solutions correctly is 1/2如.To reduce this probability to a certain level, the 
value of u can be increased. However, the same level can be achieved by 
increasing the value of k with a smaller u. The latter approach has the advantage 
of having a smaller overhead in puzzle transmission because the puzzle size will 
be smaller for a smaller u. Another advantage is the lower cost in puzzle creation 
and verification because the number of sub-puzzle creations and verifications is 
smaller for a smaller u. It is important to commit as little resource as possible in 
puzzle creation and verification by keeping u small in order to prevent DoS 
attacks. The cost of this approach is that the average work factor (1+2^)m/2 to a 
client in solving the puzzle is higher for the same 1/2^", the probability for an 
attacker to guess the solutions correctly, because work factor increase 
exponentially with k but linearly with u. The client puzzle we employ can be 
viewed as made up of one single sub-puzzle (u = 1). However, it can be easily 
extended to one consisting of more than one sub-puzzle by adding an additional 
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sub-puzzle index to the input parameter list of the hash operation during the 
puzzle construction stage. Figure 3.7 shows the client puzzle protocol used in our 
authentication protocol after incorporating the improvements on the Juels-
Brainard protocol as suggested above. If the submitted solution is incorrect, it will 
then be rejected and the execution of the protocol would be terminated. 
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Figure 3.7: The enhanced client puzzle protocol for the proposed authentication 
protocol. 
3.5 Authentication Framework 
The proposed protocol requires a framework to operate. This framework serves as 
a general testing environment for an authentication protocol to operate. It provides 
a number of modules such as Crypto-Library, Browser, and Puzzle-Handling 
Modules. In this section, the structure of this framework is described. Basically, it 
can be divided into two parts: the Client Architecture and the Server Architecture. 
To achieve portability, this framework supports the use of removable media for 
the storage of keys and certificates. In our framework, the simple floppy diskette 
was chosen as the removable media for testing purpose. If smart card is used as 
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the hardware token, additional installation of smart card reader and software 
packages such as the Open Card Framework (OCF) [53] or Personal 
Computer/Smart Card (PC/SC) [54] are needed for accessing the card from the 
browser. 
3.5.1 Client Architecture 
The structure of the client architecture is shown in figure 3.8 below. It is made up 
of six components: Client Authentication Module (CAM), Client Data Protection 
Module (CDPM), Hardware Token, Browser Interface, Client Puzzle Solving 
Module (CPSM), and Crypto-Library (CL). 
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Figure 3.8: The client-side architecture of the authentication framework 
Hardware Token 
Hardware Token serves as a removable media for the storage of digital certificates 
and keys in the framework. The purpose of the hardware token is to make the 
storage of client-specific data more portable. Some examples of hardware Token 
include Smart Card and Floppy diskette. In our framework, the floppy diskette is 
used as the example removable storage media for the client private key and server 
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digital certificate. Whenever these pieces of data are needed by the protocol, the 
client user will be prompted for the paths of them. The framework can then 
retrieve for the protocol the keys and certificates from the diskette according to 
the given paths. 
Browser Interface 
The Browser Interface serves as a user interface for the client user. The purpose of 
this browser interface is twofold. Firstly, it serves as an interface to display the 
server resources (in the form of HTML pages) granted by the server. Secondly, it 
serves as an interface for the client user to input the paths of the server digital 
certificate and its private key during authentication. 
Crypto-Library (CL) 
The Crypto-Library (CL) contains the implementation of different cryptographic 
functions. The types of cryptographic function include symmetric and asymmetric 
encryption/decryption functions, signature functions, hash functions, and secret 
random number generating functions. This library should be as comprehensive as 
possible to accommodate the requirements of different authentication protocols. 
Client Authentication Module {CAM) 
The Client Authentication Module (CAM) is responsible for the coordination of 
the authentication protocol operations on the client side. It communicates with the 
Server Authentication Module (SAM) on the server side through a number of 
messages and cryptographic operations in order to verify if the current user is a 
valid registered user of the server resources. This module is accompanied with a 
browser interface. A client user is required to enter through the browser interface 
the client id, path of the server certificate and path of its private key in order to 
authenticate with the server. Based on these inputs, the CAM will then formulate 
an authentication request (i.e. Message 1 of the proposed protocol) to be sent to 
the SAM on the server side. 
The CAM is also responsible for the validation of the server certificate. Every 
Chapter 3 A DoS-resistant Authentication and Key Establishment Protocol 46 
time a digital certificate is to be used, verification of the certificate should be done 
to make sure that the certificate is still valid. In our framework, we implemented 
the operations to verify freshness of the certificate and the validity of the CA 
signature on the certificate. For the first aspect, the validation is straightforward 
by comparing the timestamp on the certificate with the current time. For the 
second aspect, if the client trusts the CA signing the server certificate, the CA 
signature on the certificate can be verified by the public key of the corresponding 
CA. If a certificate is found to be invalid, it should not be used for authentication 
in the protocol. 
Client Data Protection Module (CDPM) 
After the successful completion of the authentication session by the CAM, a 
session key is established between the client and the server. The CAM will then 
pass control to the Client Data Protection Module (CDPM) to handle the 
communication session after authentication. This CDPM communicates with the 
Server Data Protection Module (SDPM) on the server side to carry out the 
communication session. In order to make this communication session secure, the 
CDPM uses the session key established to encrypt and decrypt any messages 
communicate with the server. Since both the client and the server know the 
session key, symmetric instead of asymmetric cryptography is used in order to 
have a more efficient communication. 
In the communication session, whenever the client want to send something to 
the server, the CDPM obtains the appropriate symmetric cryptographic function 
from the CL, perform the encryption and send the encrypted message to the 
SDPM on the server-side. On the other hand, when the CDPM receives something 
from the SDPM, it decrypts the message using the same cryptographic function 
and then asks the browser to display the output. 
Client Puzzle Solving Module (CPSM) 
In our authentication protocol, the client needs to solve a client puzzle before the 
remaining part of the protocol can continue. The Client Puzzle Solving Module 
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(CPSM) is the module responsible for the solving of puzzle for the client. It 
receives the puzzle passed from the CAM, solves the puzzle by brute force and 
returns the solution to the CAM, where the solution will be submitted to the server 
after further processing. 
3.5.2 Server Architecture 
The structure of the server-side architecture is depicted in figure 3.9 below. It is 
made up of four components: Server Authentication Module (SAM), Server Data 
Protection Module (SDPM), Client Puzzle Generation and Verification Module 
(CPGVM), and Crypto-Library (CL). 
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Figure 3.9: The server-side architecture of the authentication framework 
Crypto-Library (CL) 
Similar to the CL on the client side, the CL on the server side provides the set of 
cryptographic functions to meet the requirements of the underlying authentication 
protocols. 
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Server Authentication Module (SAM) 
The Server Authentication Module (SAM) is responsible for the coordination of 
the protocol operations on the server side. It communicates with the Client 
Authentication Module (CAM) on the client side in order to carry out the protocol 
operations. 
In the initial phase of the proposed authentication protocol, when the SAM 
receives an authentication request (message 1 of the proposed protocol) from the 
CAM, the SAM passes the client identity in this request to the CPGVM. Then the 
CPGVM will generate a new client puzzle for this client request. Later, when the 
SAM receives the puzzle solution from the CAM, it passes the solution to the 
CPGVM for verification. After that, it retrieves the required cryptographic 
functions from the CL in order to carry out the cryptographic operations required 
by the protocol. Similar to the CAM, the SAM also needs to carry out the same 
certificate validation operations in order to verify the validity of the client 
certificates. 
Server Data Protection Module (SDPM) 
The Server Data Protection Module (SDPM) works closely with the CDPM on the 
client side to carry out the communication session after authentication. Similar to 
the situation on the client side, a session key is established by the SAM on the 
server side after the authentication session. The SAM then passes control to the 
SDPM to handle the subsequent communication session. 
In the communication session, the SDPM employs the established session key 
to decrypt any messages received from the CDPM using the symmetric 
cryptographic function provided by the CL. Besides, when the SDPM needs to 
send the client the server resources, it will also encrypt them using the established 
session key beforehand. 
Client Puzzle Generation and Verification Module {CPGVM) 
The functions of this module are closely related to the CPSM on the client side. 
This module is again tailor-made for our proposed authentication protocol. It is 
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responsible for the puzzle generation and puzzle solution verification as instructed 
by the SAM described above. 
3.6 Implementations 
In this section, a number of implementation issues of the operations in the 
authentication framework and the proposed protocol are presented. Firstly, the set 
of tools used in the implementation will be outlined and the reasons for choosing 
them will be explained. Since our proposed protocol is public-key based, we need 
a set of keys and certificates in order for the protocol to operate. In this section, 
we will also describe how they are generated. Then the formats of the protocol 
messages are explained. Although the puzzle generation operation seems simple, 
there are a number of subtle problems during implementation of this operation 
that need to be considered, especially in the determination of the puzzle difficulty 
level. Finally, the implementation of the (C, t) non-existence checking operation is 
described. We will have a look at how to implement a fast and efficient checking 
on the (C, t) table. 
3.6.1 Software and Programming Tools 
The successful implementation of the proposed protocol and framework requires a 
set of software packages and programming tools. To allow for platform 
independency and portability of our system, we have chosen Java as the primary 
programming language in implementing our proposed protocol. Java has the 
special property that a Java source program is compiled to some bytecodes instead 
of executable program. These bytecodes are actually some instructions for the 
Java Virtual Machine (JVM). So in order to execute a Java program, a JVM needs 
to be installed to recognize the generated bytecodes. Under this design, a Java 
program becomes executable in any platforms without further compilation 
provided that a JVM is installed. Currently, the JVM is widely available in 
different platform including Windows, Linux, Unix and Mac. So by implementing 
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the proposed protocol in Java, the protocol becomes widely executable in different 
platforms. Another reason for choosing Java is its comprehensive support of 
security API. Since our protocol involves many cryptographic operations such as 
one-way hash function, symmetric and asymmetric encryption/decryption, etc. If 
the chosen programming language has good support on these cryptographic 
functions, the complexity of the implementation can be reduced a lot. Starting 
from version 1.4 of the Java2 Standard Development Kit (J2SDK), Java 
Cryptography Extension (JCE) has been integrated. JCE [55] is a set of packages 
that provides a framework and implementation for a wide range of cryptographic 
functions. It is designed in a way that other cryptographic libraries can be plugged 
in as service providers. By using Java, the Crypto-Library (CL) required by our 
authentication framework can be easy implemented in the form of service 
provider libraries. However, since the default security library of Java do not has 
the common RSA encryption/decryption functions. In order to use the RSA 
cryptographic algorithms in our proposed protocol, we have plugged in a third 
party service provider called Bouncy Castle [56] that has the RSA algorithms 
implemented. The chosen version of the Bouncy Castle Provider is 1.13. 
Since our protocol is public-key based, digital certificates and private keys are 
also needed for the successful execution of the protocol. Because of this, we have 
installed the OpenCA [57] software package in a Linux machine to act as the 
Certificate Authority (CA). OpenCA is a software package that provides a 
framework for PKI project development. In order for the CA to function properly, 
the OpenSSL [58] software package was also installed. The OpenSSL is a 
software package implementing a general-purpose cryptographic library. With 
both of these software packages, we can then generate private keys and X.509 
digital certificates for the protocol. 
3.6.2 The Message Formats 
The message formats of some of the important variables in the protocol are shown 
in figure 3.10 below. The Clientldentity and Serverldentity in our system are fixed 
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to have a length of 8 characters. In our implementation, SHA-1 was used 
throughout the whole protocol as the one-way hash function. Since the hash 
output of this hash function is 160，the maximum possible value of the puzzle 
difficulty level k, which is equal to the hash output length, is thus 160. So only 
one byte is needed for the difficulty level. The strings zl and z2 used in the puzzle 
generation are both outputs of the hash function SHA-1, so a size of 20 bytes (160 
bits/8) is needed. The length of the puzzle solution (zl '<l, k>) may be less than 20 
bytes. But since the solution needed to be returned together with the string zl<k+l, 
L>, a total of 20 bytes are required for these two strings. Nc and Ns are the nonces 
used for handling the replay attack, the longer of them, the more secure is the 
system. Typically, the length of a nonce is 64 bits, which is also the length we 
used in the implementation, so 8 bytes are required for the storage of them. 
b y t e [ ] C l i e n t l d e n t i t y = new b y t e [ 8 ] ; 
b y t e [ ] S e r v e r l d e n t i t y = new b y t e [ 8 ] ; 
b y t e k ; 
b y t e [ ] z l = new b y t e [ 2 0 ] ; 
b y t e [ ] z2 = new b y t e [ 2 0 ] ; 
b y t e [ ] s o l u t i o n = new b y t e [ 2 0 ] ; 
b y t e [ ] Nc 二 new b y t e [ 8 ] ; 
b y t e [ ] Ns 二 new b y t e [ 8 ] ; 
Figure 3.10: The message formats 
3.5.3 Browser Interface 
In our authentication framework, the authentication protocol is triggered to start 
by the client when a request for the server resources is made. In our 
implementation, we have created a simple browser on the client side for this 
purpose. This browser supports several types of protocol. 
When the client want to use the browser for normal web browsing. He/She can 
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employs the traditional http protocol and enter the target URL, e.g. 
http://www.yahoo.com，to get the output. On the other hand, if https is used 
instead, the proposed authentication protocol will be triggered to start. The dialog 
box shown in figure 3.12 below will be prompted out to ask the client for the 
locations of its private key and the server digital certificates needed by the 
protocol. If the authentication protocol is successful, the server will encrypt the 
requested resources using the established session key and send to the client 
browser. The client browser then decrypts the content and displays the output in 
the browser window. All these operations are done in a way transparent to the end 
user. Additional protocols can be incorporated in a similar fashion, but the 
protocol name should be different from the existing ones. For example, we have 
also integrated the famous SSIVTLS protocol into the browser. The SSL/TLS 
protocol can be employed by replacing the protocol https by ssl. For example, to 
access the resource page www.adomain.com/resources.html, 
ssl://www. adomain. com/resources, html should be entered into the address bar of 
the browser in order to trigger the start of the SSL/TLS protocol session. 
___1_11圍 
URL: I Ii 
Figure 3.11: The browser interface 
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Figure 3.12: The certificate and key path input interface 
3.6.4 Calculation of the Difficulty Level 
In the puzzle generation process, the server needs to determine how many leading 
bits of the pre-image zl need to be hidden. So before the generation of this string, 
the server should determine the difficulty level of the puzzle first. 
In order to determine the difficulty level, we should find a way to calculate the 
resource availability of the server. In our implementation, we have considered two 
types of server resources. They are the CPU and the memory resources. As 
mention before, the difficulty level of the puzzle should be inversely proportional 
to the resource availability. Based on this principal, the difficulty level is 
calculated as follow. 
Firstly, the percentage of memory that is currently used is calculated using the 
following formula: 
MemUsedPercentage = 100 * {TotalMemory - FreeMemory) / TotalMemory; 
TotalMemory and FreeMemory respectively represent the amount of memory 
available to the Java JVM and the amount that is free for use. By default, only a 
certain amount of the system memory is allocated to the Java JVM when it is 
initialized. In our implementation, we change the settings such that the JVM is 
able to use all the system memory of the server machine. Then we make use of the 
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Java API t o t a l M e m o r y 0 and f reeMemory () to determine the values of 
the variables TotalMemory and FreeMemory respectively. With the values of the 
TotalMemory and FreeMemory, the percentage of memory of the server machine 
that is currently used, i.e. MemUsedPercentage, can then be calculated by the 
above formula. 
Similar to the memory usage, the percentage of server CPU resource that is 
currently used also needs to be determined. The calculation of this percentage is 
more complex than in the case of memory resource. To determine this percentage, 
we first need to find out the computationally intensive components of the 
proposed protocol. As we know, the RSA cryptographic operations in the 
proposed protocol are computationally intensive by nature; the experimental 
measurements on the execution time of the cryptographic operations in our 
protocol in section 5.3.3 of Chapter 5 also support our claim. So in order to 
determine the CPU resource usage, we use a global counter to monitor the number 
of RSA cryptographic operations the server is processing. Assume that the server 
is able to process a maximum of about ALLOWED—CRYPTO一OP_NUM 
cryptographic operations per second. Then we can calculate the percentage of 
used CPU resource by the following formula. 
CPUUsedPercentage = im'^CryptoOpCnt / ALLOWED_CRYPTO_OP_NUM; 
ALLOWED—CRYPTO_NUM is the allowable number of cryptographic 
operation the server is processing at a time. CryptoOpCnt is a global counter 
monitoring the number of cryptographic operations the server is currently 
processing. Based on these two values, the percentage of CPU resource used, i.e. 
CPUUsedPercentage, can then be calculated by this formula. 
However, since our server is multithreaded, there may have more than one 
thread modifying the global counter CryptoOpCnt. Thus the integrity of this 
counter may be invalid. To avoid simultaneous access, we have implemented a 
lock CryptoOpCntLock on this counter. Then the threads are synchronized in a 
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way that the lock should be obtained before the counter can be modified. When a 
thread finished modifying the counter, the lock is immediately released for other 
waiting threads. Under this mechanism, the counter is protected from 
simultaneous accesses. 
We now have both the percentages of memory and CPU resources used. The 
puzzle difficulty level can then be calculated from these two values. In our 
implementation, the code fragment used to calculate the difficulty level is shown 
in figure 3.14 below. For each type of resources, there are the lower and upper 
thresholds, as depicted in figure 3.13. A puzzle will not be distributed until the 
percentage is increased to a certain level; we called it the lower threshold. After 
that, the difficulty level increases with the percentage of resource usage in a 
proportional manner until another level, we called it the upper threshold, is 
reached. After that, the difficulty level remains constant with the percentage of 
resource usage. MIN_K and MAX_K are respectively the minimum and 
maximum possible value of the difficulty level. In line 9 and 13 of figure 3.14, a 
difficulty level is calculated for each of the two resources. The final difficulty 
level is then taken to be the maximum of them. 
difficulty Level • 
MAX K 
"UZT 
MIN K f ^ , , 
- ^ ^ Resource Usage 
0 LOWER—THRESHOLD UPPER—THRESHOLD Percentage 
Figure 3.13: The Difficulty Level Determination Function 
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1 If (MemUsedPercentage > LOWER_MEM_THRESHOLD or 
2 CPUUsedPercentage > LOWER_CRYPTO_THRESHOLD) 
3 { 
4 If (MemUsedPercentage >= UPPER一MEM一THRESHOLD or 
5 CPUUsedPercentage >= UPPER_CRYPTO_THRESHOLD) 
6 difficultyLevel = MAX_K; 
7 else 
8 { 
9 int crypto—k = (MAX_K-MIN_K)*(CPUUsedPercentage-
10 LOWER_CRYPTO_THRESHOLD)/(UPPER_CRYPTO_THRESHOLD-
11 LOWER一 CRYPTO_THRESHOLD)+MIN_K; 
12 
13 int mem_k = (MAX_K-MIN_K)*(MemUsedPercentage-
14 LOWER_MEM_THRESHbLD)/(UPPER_MEM_THRESHOLD-
15 LOWER一MEM 一T H R E S H O L D ) + M I N _ K ; 
16 
17 If (crypto_k > mem_k) 
18 difficultyLevel = crypto 一k; 
19 else 




24 difficultyLevel = 0; 
Figure 3.14: Calculation of the puzzle difficulty level 
3.6.5 (C, t) Non-Existence Verification 
In the proposed protocol, the server needs to verify the non-existence of the (C, t) 
pair in a (C, t) table maintained by the server. Since this verification is done 
almost just after the reception of message 3 of the protocol and before the 
verification of the puzzle solution, this operation should be fast to avoid being 
employed by the attackers to launch DoS attacks. However, as time goes on, the 
size of the (C, t) table will increase and thus lengthen the (C, t) non-existence 
verification time. In order to reduce the time, we implemented this table in the 
form of a hash table. By using hash table, the server can find the target bucket in 
the hash table by a single fast hash operation. In our implementation, we 
employed the Hashtable class of Java to build the hash table. For the load 
factor of the hash table, the value of 0.75，which is the value recommended by Sun 
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Microsystems [59] as a good tradeoff between space and time, is used. 
As described before, the (C, t) entry can be removed once it is expired. 
However, since the precision of the time t is up to a second, if we really need to 
remove it immediately after expiration. We need to scan the hash table once per 
second in order to delete those expired entries. So in order to relieve the burden of 
the server, a better strategy is to scan the hash table for expired entries in a longer 
interval. However, this interval should not be too long, otherwise, the hash table 
may grow to a very large size and take up many memory resources of the server. 
In the proposed protocol, the size of a (C, t) pair is not very large; it requires only 
12 bytes in our implementation. How long this interval should be depends on the 
amount of memory of the server machine. The more the memory, the longer can 
be the interval. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter introduces our proposed DoS-resistant Authentication and Key 
Establishment Protocol. This protocol employs a client puzzle technique to handle 
DoS attacks. Whenever a DoS attacker wants to access extensively the resources 
of the server, it must first commit some of its resources in solving the puzzle 
before the remaining parts of the protocol can continue. We have also outlined 
some weaknesses of the famous Juels-Brainard protocol, which our improved 
client puzzle protocol manages to avoid. Besides, we have described the structure 
of an authentication framework, which provides the execution environment for the 
proposed protocol. This framework consists of the client and the server 
architectures. Moreover, we have outlined the set of software packages and 
programming tools necessary for the successful implementation of the protocol 
and the framework. A number of subtle problems in the implementation are also 
described. These include the use of a global counter in the calculation of the 
difficulty level and the use of hash table to reduce the execution time of the (C, t) 
non-existence checking operation. 
Chapter 4 
Security Analysis and Formal Proof 
4.1 Introduction 
Security analysis is an important and necessary step in the design of a security 
protocol. Through careful security analysis, not only the correctness of a protocol 
can be verified, security flaws and missed assumptions in the protocol can also be 
identified. In this chapter, a thorough analysis on the security strength of the 
proposed authentication protocol described in the previous chapter will be given. 
We will first give an informal analysis on the security strength of our protocol in 
defending against the attacks described in Chapter 2. Through this informal case-
based security analysis, we can see how effective is our protocol in handling an 
attack in real situation. In the past decades, different formal analysis methods for 
security protocols have also been proposed. In this chapter, we will also have a 
review on the existing formal analysis methods. Then a formal security analysis of 
the proposed protocol will be given to further strengthen our claim on the security 
strength of the proposed protocol. Since this thesis focuses on authentication and 
key establishment protocol, we will assume in the following analyses that the 
employed cryptographic algorithms and techniques are secure and the 
concentration will be placed on the analysis of the protocol itself only. 
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4.2 Security Analysis 
In this section, we present an informal analysis on the security strength of the 
proposed authentication and key establishment protocol. In this analysis, we 
concentrate on the effectiveness of the protocol in handling the common set of 
attacks on an authentication and key establishment protocol. In particular, the 
denial-of-service attack, which is also our main interested attack, the replay attack, 
the chosen-text attack, the interleaving attack and a miscellaneous of attacks 
described in Section 2.4 will be examined. 
4.2.1 Denial-of-Service Attacks 
This sub-section analyzes the proposed authentication protocol to check if an 
unauthenticated client (or attacker) could exhaust server resources. 
In our authentication protocol, the server receives two messages from the 
client. After receiving message 1, the server does not need to spend any expensive 
computations. The construction of the puzzle requires just two relatively fast hash 
operations. As the puzzle is constructed in a stateless fashion, no memory resource 
would be consumed. After the reception of message 3, computationally expensive 
public-key operations are needed to verify the client signature, and memory space 
may be required to store the (C, t) pair. However, these resources would only be 
consumed after the submitted puzzle solution has been verified correct, i.e. the 
client commitment of its resources has been assured. The non-existence checking 
of (C, t) and the timestamp checking prevent an attacker from using a previously 
submitted solution. Therefore, the proposed authentication protocol ensures that 
the server will not be required to commit its expensive resources before 
confirming that the client has consumed some of its resources during the 
authentication protocol session. Further, an attacker could experience the risk of 
exhausting its resources if it keeps on issuing authentication requests to the server. 
Moreover, the server will assign only one copy of its memory resource to an 
authenticated client. 
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4.2.2 Replay Attacks 
Replay attacks refer to those attacks involving the use of information from a 
single previous protocol execution, on the same or a different verifier [47]. 
In a public-key cryptographic protocol, the potential messages that an attacker 
may replay are those that the attacker is unable to produce. In our authentication 
and key establishment protocol, messages 3 and 4 are two such messages as they 
are encrypted using private keys unknown to the attacker. 
In message 3 of the proposed authentication protocol, there is a bit-string 
z\<k+\, L> embedded inside the encryption using private-key kc^. This bit-string 
is generated and sent by the server to the client in message 2 of the protocol. It is 
unpredictable to the client as it is generated using a one-way hash function with a 
long server secret key s and current timestamp t as inputs. Also, as described in 
Section 3.4.2, the length of zl<A:+l, L> should be sufficiently long (at least 64 bits) 
for the server to detect a fake timestamp. The bit-string zl<k+l, L> thus serves the 
purpose of a nonce for the server to ensure the freshness of message 3 and so the 
replay attack can be prevented. 
The replay of message 4 is prevented by using the challenge-response 
technique. A long random nonce Nc is generated and sent by the client to the 
server in message 3. It is then embedded inside the signature of message 4 to 
assure the client the freshness of this message. 
4.2.3 Chosen-text Attacks 
A chosen-text attack is targeted at a challenge-response protocol, which is 
characterized by an attacker causing another entity to encrypt or decrypt a chosen 
text using the secret key of the entity. 
In the proposed authentication protocol, E{Nc}ks in message 3 and E{Ns]kc in 
the last protocol message are the only ciphertexts produced by encryption using 
public keys. However, the plaintext counterpart Nc and Ns respectively are never 
transmitted in any subsequent messages, so chosen-ciphertext attack is not 
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possible in the proposed protocol. For those ciphertexts produced by encryption 
using private keys, it can be easily decrypted using the corresponding public keys, 
so we are not interested in the chosen-ciphertext attack on this type of ciphertext. 
On the other hand, there are two encryption operations using private keys in 
messages 3 and 4. However, plaintext counterparts of these two encryptions 
contain a self-chosen random number, so choosing the entire plaintext in the 
chosen-plaintext attack is impossible. 
4.2.4 Interleaving Attacks 
To compromise the proposed protocol using interleaving attack, the attacker must 
be able to derive those ciphertexts produced using the unknown private keys. In 
the proposed protocol, none of these ciphertexts in any of the protocol messages 
has the same format as the other three protocol messages or their components. 
Also, none of them has a format, which is a combination of the formats of the 
other three messages and their components. This makes the attacker unable to 
derive the desirable ciphertexts in one message from the other 3 messages of our 
protocol for an interleaving attack. If the attacker uses the protocol message of 
a previous protocol run as the 产 protocol message in the current run, this 
corresponds to the replay attack, which has been addressed in Section 4.2.2 above. 
Another possible mode of interleaving attack is by forced delay [47], in which an 
attacker intercepted the protocol message of one protocol instance, relayed it at 
some later point in time and then uses it as the protocol message of another 
protocol instance in order to achieve impersonation or other deceptions. However 
this is not considered as a true attack because the attacker acts only as part of the 
communication link between the communicating parties without altering the 
content and aliveness of the protocol messages [47]. 
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4.2.5 Others 
As all the four protocol messages are asymmetric to each other, with identities of 
the sender and receiver embedded inside the cryptographic messages, together 
with the use of asymmetric keys, reflection attacks [47] can thus be prevented by 
the proposed protocol. Besides, man-in-the-middle attacks can also be easily 
prevented by the protocol as this attack can be foiled by the adoption of 
certificate-based public-key signature [28]. 
4.3 Formal Proof Methods 
In this section, we will have a review on the major existing formal proof and 
analysis methods for the cryptographic protocols. Catherine Meadows [60] 
classified the formal analysis techniques into four types. The first one is the use of 
the general-purpose specification languages and verification tools for expressing 
the protocols and verifying their correctness. The second one is the use of the 
expert system to model a protocol in the form of a state machine. In the third 
approach, a protocol is represented and analyzed using modal logics. This 
approach is probably the most popular one and the research in this area has been 
very active in the past decades. The last one makes use of the algebraic term-
rewriting concept in describing and analyzing a security protocol. Different 
researchers [61] [62] [63] have discussions on the properties and features of each 
of these approaches. In this section, we will examine the strengths and weaknesses 
of them in order to choose one for the formal analysis of our proposed protocol. 
4.3.1 General-purpose Specification Languages and Verification 
Tools 
General-purpose Specification Languages and Verification Tools is one of the 
earliest approaches used in the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Initially, 
people employ specification languages and verification tools used in other 
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research areas to model and verify cryptographic protocols. 
In the first step of this approach, the analysts used a general-purpose 
specification language to specify a cryptographic protocol and its requirements. 
For example, Varadharajan [64] used LOTOS to specify authentication protocols. 
Kemmerer [65] used the formal specification language Ina Jo to analyzing 
encryption protocols. In his approach, the properties of the protocol are expressed 
as state invariants. However, the role of an active intruder is not included in the 
model. There are also many other specification languages such as the Z 
specification language [66] and Petri Nets [67]. 
After expressing the protocol in the specification language, the next step is to 
analyze it by the verification tools. The Formal System Europe [68] has used the 
Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) approach to specify the principals in 
a protocol and uses the Failure Divergence's Refinement (FDR) tool to check 
whether the implementation of the protocol satisfies the specification. 
Although the general-purpose analysis technique is shown to be able to 
uncover flaws in current security protocols [16], it is generally not suitable in the 
formal verification of security protocols. Analysis of cryptographic protocols is a 
specific problem. A general-purpose analysis technique is not able to consider all 
kinds of subtle attacks and properties of a cryptographic protocol. Also, the model 
of the attacker as a general principal can lead to the state-explosion problem, thus 
breaking the analysis process [69]. 
4.3.2 Expert System Approach 
The expert system approach is a kind of state-based analysis technique. In the 
expert system approach, each participant is modeled as a state machine, which 
contains finite memory. Whenever a participant sends or receives messages, the 
state transits to a new state. Under this approach, different behaviors of a protocol 
are explored. The Interrogator proposed by Millen [70] is one important example 
of this approach. In the Interrogator approach, a protocol is expressed in prolog 
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language. Knowledge of the principals in the system changes as messages are 
transferred between the principals. The Interrogator tries to find those paths that 
can lead to a given insecure state from an initial state. If such paths can be found, 
then the underlying protocol is said to be insecure. Another important example is 
the NRL Protocol Analyzer proposed by Meadows [71]. This protocol analyzer is 
again prolog-based. It uses the same principal as the Interrogator to try to search 
for the paths to an insecure state. An advantage of the NRL Protocol Analyzer 
over the Interrogator is that the number of protocol runs is unlimited. This allows 
the analysis of attacks involving parallel runs of protocols. It also enables infinite 
state spaces to be explored. However, unlike the Interrogator, guidance from the 
user is needed to avoid infinite loop from the given insecure state. 
Although the expert system approach is useful in protocol analysis, Catherine 
Meadows [60] has pointed out that the analysis technique may not be complete. 
The analysis process is also time-consuming as exhaustive searches are involved. 
Sometimes, infinite loops may also occur. 
4.3.3 Modal Logic Approach 
Modal Logic is one of the most widely used formal methods for the analysis of 
cryptographic protocols. Basically, it can be classified into epistemic logic and 
doxastic logic. Epistemic logic is logic of knowledge while doxastic logic is logic 
of belief. Usually, logic of knowledge is used to reason about the security of a 
protocol while the logic of belief is used to reason about the trust of the principals. 
In the initial phase of an analysis using modal logic, the properties of the 
underlying protocol are expressed in the form of statements using the logic-
associated language. Then a set of inference rules and axioms are used to deduce 
new statements from the existing ones. This evolution process continues until the 
goals set by the analysts are reached. If the final goals cannot be arrived, this may 
imply that there are security flaws in the protocols or important assumptions are 
missed. 
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In the past decades, there are many different types of logics proposed by the 
security experts. Among these logics, the BAN logic [11] proposed by Burrows, 
Abadi, and Needham is probably the most influential one. It has been widely used 
in cryptographic protocol analysis because of its simple and straightforward 
properties. The authors also said that the logic lacks all the features that would 
make it difficult to use. However, the BAN logic is logic of belief only and does 
not reason about the knowledge of the principals in the protocol. Also, many 
universal assumptions are required in the logic. For example, it assumes the 
present of sufficient redundancy in an encrypted message in order to allow the 
principals who decrypts it to be able to know the correctness of the key used. 
Besides, the BAN logic does not distinguish between the possession of a message 
and the belief in it. Although there are examples of successful discovery of 
security flaws [11] using the BAN logic, there are also criticisms on the usage of it 
[72] [73]. Gong, Needham and Yahalom [74] later proposed the GNY logic, which 
is an extension of the BAN logic. In the GNY logic, a new notation of 
recognizability to captures the expectation of a principal on the message content it 
receives is introduced. The notion of possession and belief of a message is also 
separated. This helps to express the case that a principal holding a message that he 
does not believe in. However, the enhancements made on the BAN logic lead to a 
large increase in the number of rules, thus making the GNY logic much more 
complex and difficult to use. 
In 1990, Pierre Bieber [75] proposed a knowledge-oriented logic called C K T 5 . ‘ 
Syverson [76] also proposed another knowledge-based logic called KPL. Bieber 
claimed that logic based on belief rather knowledge, i.e. like the BAN logic, do 
not guarantee security because belief will only turn out to be knowledge under 
correct behavior of the agents. Although CKT5 is much more robust in proving 
security properties of a protocol, the common public-key based protocols are not 
supported in the logic. 
As can been seen, the logic of knowledge and the logic of belief have both 
their respective advantages. The knowledge-based logic is able to analyze the 
security aspects of a protocol while the belief-based logic analyzes the trust in a 
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protocol. Coffey and Saidha [17] thus proposed a new formal logic, which is 
based on both logics of knowledge and belief, for analyzing the common public-
key based protocols. With the incorporation of the properties of both logics of 
knowledge and belief, this new logic allows the analysis of the security and 
trustworthiness of a wide range of protocols. Because this logic has taken into 
account the basic assumptions of a public-key protocol, it is particularly suitable 
for the analysis of public-key based protocols. 
4.3.4 Algebraic Term-Rewriting Approach 
In the algebraic term-rewriting approach, a cryptographic system is modeled as an 
algebraic term-rewriting system. Dolev and Yao [77] are the first in applying this 
approach in protocol analysis. In the Dolev-Yao model, an attacker is considered 
to have full control over the words in the term-rewriting system. Thus proving a 
protocol secure is equivalent to proving the inability of the term-rewriting system 
in generating the secret words, which are expected to be unknown to the attacker. 
Dolev and Yao developed mathematical models for the cascade and name-stamp 
protocols and algorithms for checking the security of them. However, they 
concentrate more on the distribution of information rather than authentication in 
the protocol. Abadi and Gordon [78] later proposed the Spi Calculus, which is an 
extension of the pi calculus [79], for describing and analyzing cryptographic 
protocols. In the spi calculus approach, protocols are represented as processes and 
the security properties of the protocols are represented as observational 
equivalence. However, Cottier [80] has pointed out that proving properties in spi 
calculus is very hard and it is best to have tools to automate the proof. 
4.4 Formal Proof of the Proposed Protocol 
In this section, we employ the Coffey-Saidha analysis technique [17] to formulate 
a formal proof of the proposed authentication and key establishment protocol. 
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This analysis technique is a logic based on both belief and knowledge. As 
described in Section 4.3.3 above, this logic has taken into account the basic 
assumptions of PKI, so it is particularly suitable for the analysis of public-key 
based cryptographic protocols. 
4.4.1 Notations 
The notations, inference rules and axioms of the logic are outlined in [17]. For the 
convenience of the readers, we tabulate as shown in figure 4.1 and 4.2 the 
essential ones, especially those used in the present proof. Besides, the meanings of 
different values of tn are shown in table 4.1. Moreover, to avoid confusion on 
notation, we let the timestamp of the puzzle used in our authentication protocol be 
t" instead of t in the proof that follows. 
Symbol Meaning 
ENT Set of all possible entities 
Public key of entity Z 
k -^i Private key of entity E 
t Time variable 
tn Time at the end of protocol step n 
e{x, k) Encryption of 义 using key k 
K^ Entity Z knows statement 中 at time t 
Ij^ Entity Z knows and can reproduce object x at time t 
BY^ Entity Z believes statement • is true at time t 
C(x, y) The object x contains the object y 
t, x) Entity Z sends message x at time t 
t, x) Entity Z receives message x at time t 
V Universal quantification 
3 Existential quantification 
G Membership of a set 





Figure 4.1: The logic language 
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R3: From (p A q) infer p 
A 4 : 3t3x3y {3i, I G { E N T } L^y A C(y, x)-^SjjG {ENT} Lj,,x) 
AS: 3t 3;C t, x) — L I , A 3/，/E { E N T / Z } 3广 t' > t R(i, t', x)) 
A 6 : 3t 3JC (R(X, t, x) — Lj：, A 3/，is { E N T / Z } Bt', t' < t S(i, t', x)) 
A 8 a : 3t 3x iG { E N T } ^k^ 八 W , t'<t，L,- , ' 0 ( X，k ^ ) ) A -N(3 ;Y (R(i, t, y) A 
CCy, e{x, 
A 9 : VR (V/，iG { E N T } LI,, kf' A V ; , ; G { E N T " } Lj, 
Figure 4.2: Inference Rules and Axioms 
Table 4.1: Meanings of tn 
fO The time at the start a protocol session. 
tl The time at which the server receives message 1 from the client. 
t l The time at which the client receives message 2 from the server. 
The time at which the server receives message 3 from the client. 
tA The time at which the client receives message 4 from the server. 
tQ The time at the end of the whole protocol session. 
4.4.2 The Proof 
The proof is formed by first applying the logic's inference rules and axioms to the 
protocol's initial assumption statements to deduce new statements. Such inference 
rules and axioms would then be applied to these new statements to deduce another 
set of new statements until the protocol's goals are achieved. So before 
commencing the deduction process, we need to decide the initial assumptions and 
the goals of our protocol. 
Protocol Goals: 
In the proposed authentication protocol, the mutual authentication process and 
secret nonce exchange are carried out through messages 3 and 4 of the protocol. 
So the main goals of our authentication protocol are that messages 3 and 4 of the 
protocol are timely originated from the expected entities and associated with the 
correct nonces and keys. 
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i. tl<t< t3, S{C, t, eQi{zV<l, Jo, zl<k+l, L>, t", k, C, S, e{Nc, h)), kc 
1))) 
The first goal states that after step 3 of the authentication protocol, i.e. at time t3, 
the server S knows that client C, the communicating entity, has sent the 
cryptographic part of message 3 of the authentication protocol, i.e. e(h(zV<l, k>, 
zl<k+l, L>, t", K C, S, e(Nc, ks)l kc\ between the time tl and t3. When 
receiving message 3，the server can only be certain that the message was 
generated after tl because zl<k-\-l,L>, which is inside the message, was generated 
after tl. Therefore, the time range during which message was generated should be 
between tl and t3. Moreover, the string L> is an important piece of data 
because it was generated by the server; and so the server must trust this piece of 
data. As message 3 was sent by the client after t2 (according to the protocol 
definition), one may say that the time range at which the client sent the message 
should be between tl and t3. However, the server cannot know for certain whether 
the client has actually sent message 3. The server cannot trust this uncertain client 
action; it can only trust those data generated by itself. In this case, the piece of 
data is zl<k+l, L> and the server knows that the string was generated by itself 
after tl. For the time range in goal (ii) below, the argument is just the same except 
that the role of zl〈灸+1, L> is replaced by Nc, Since the identity of an entity can be 
proved by showing the procession of its private key in the PKI framework, we 
only need to care about the part of message 3 that involves the private key and 
secret nonce of the client in the above goal statement. 
ii. Kc, t2<t< t4，S(S, t, e(h(S, C, e{Nc, ks), e(Ns, kc)\ ks'^))) 
The second goal states that after step 4 of the authentication protocol, i.e. at time 
t4, client C knows that server S has sent the cryptographic part of message 4 of the 
authentication protocol, i.e. eih{S, C, e(Nc, ks), e(Ns, kc)), between time tl 
and t4. For the same reason as goal (i) above, only the cryptographic part of 
message 4 is included in goal (ii). 
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Initial assumptions: 
There are four initial assumptions to our protocol. The first two concern assuming 
the communicating entities have authentic copies of all the required public keys as 
described in Section 3.3 and the latter two deal with the secrecy of nonces. 
⑴ Lc,to(Jcs) 
The first assumption states that client C knows fe, the public key of the server S, 
at the start of the protocol session, i.e. at time fO. 
{\i)Ls,tQikc) 
The second assumption states that server S knows kc, the public key of the client 
C, at the start of the protocol session, i.e. at time rt). 
(iii) Kc, tiiyi, ie {ENT}, Vr, t < t2, tNc) 
The third assumption states that the client C knows that no entities know its secret 
nonce Nc before tl, because the secret nonce is generated after t2. This statement 
is important as it assumes the freshness of the client's secret nonce. 
(iv) Ks, ,3(V/, ie {ENT}, Vr, t < fi, ~^Li’ tNs) 
The fourth assumption states that the server S knows that no entities know its 
secret nonce Ns before t3, because the generation of the secret nonce is done after 
t3. Similar to assumption (iii), this statement is important as it assumes the 
freshness of the server's secret nonce. 
Deduction Process: 
If S receives message 3 of the proposed authentication protocol, the following 
statement holds true: 
Ks,t3(R(S, t3, e(h(zr<h k>, zl<^+l, L>, t'\ k, C, S, e(Nc, fe)), kc^))) (1) 
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By applying the inference rule R3 to axiom A6 (if an entity receives an object, 
some other entity must has sent the object before), statement (1) can be used to 
deduce the following: 
Ks,t3&U ie {ENTO}, t < S{U t, e{h{zV<h k>, zl<^+l, L〉，t'\ k, C, S, e(Nc, 
ks)l kc'))) � 
The string zl<A:+l, L> was created by the server using its secret key s and a 
timestamp t" > tl. This means that no entity knows zl<A:+l, L> before the time tl. 
Therefore, the following statement holds true: 
Ks,,3(V/’ ie {ENT}, Vt, t<tl, -nLijzl<k+l, L>) (3) 
By manipulation of axiom A5 (if an entity sends a message x at time t, then this 
entity must know x at time 0, statement (3) becomes: 
Ks, ,3(V/，ie {ENT}, W’ t<th t, zl<k+h L>)) (4) 
As statement (4) is also valid for all messages containing zl<k+l, L>, we can 
deduce the following statement: 
Ks,t3(yi, ie {ENT}, W, t < tl, -^SiU t, e{h{zV<l, k>, zl<k+l, L>， t" , k, C, S, e(Nc, 
ks)l kc'))) � 
Combining statements (2) and (5), the following statement can be deduced: 
Ks, t3(^U ie {ENTAS}，3t, tl < t < t3, S(U U e{h{zV<l, k>, zl<A:+l, L>, t'\ k, C, S, 
e(Nc, ks)), kc'))) (6) 
In message 4 of the proposed authentication protocol, the role of the client nonce 
Nc (to ensure message freshness) is the same as that of zl<k+\, L> in message 3. 
So by applying a similar deduction process to message 4，statements (7) - (11) can 
be deduced as below. 
Chapter 4 Security Analysis and Formal Proof 72 
If C receives message 4, the following statement holds true: 
Kc,tmC. eih(S, C，e(Nc, ks), e(Ns, kc)l ks'))) (7) 
By applying inference rule R3 to axiom A6, the following can be deduced from 
statement (7): 
Kc, ,4(3/, ie {ENT/C}, 3U t < t4, S(i, t, e(h(S, C, e(Nc, ks), e(Ns, kc)\ ks^))) (8) 
From the initial assumption (iii), no entity knows Nc before tl. So by axiom A4 (if 
a piece of data is constructed from other pieces of data, then each piece of data 
involved in the construction must be known to some entity), the following can be 
deduced from (8): 
Kc, ,4(V/’ ie {ENT}, \/t, t < t2, -nL,；, e(h(S, C, e(Nc’ ks), e(Ns, kc)\ ks^)) (9) 
By manipulation of axiom A5, the following can be deduced from (9): 
Kc, ie {ENT}, \/t, t < tl, t, e(h(S, C, e(Nc, ks), e{Ns, kc)), ks^))) (10) 
Combining statements (8) and (10)，the following statement can be deduced: 
Kc’t40i, ie {ENT/C}, 3u t2<t< t4, S(i, t, e(h(S, C, e(Nc’ ks), e{Ns, kc)), 
According to axiom A9 (a private key is only known to its rightful owner), only C 
knows its private key kc '�Therefore , by applying axiom A9, (12), which 
corresponds to goal (i), could be deduced from (6): 
Ks,t3{3t, tl<t< t3, S{C, t, e{h{zV<\, k>, zl<k+l, L>, t", k, C, S, e(Nc, ks)�, kc^))) 
(12) 
By a similar argument, only S knows its private key ks'�, so statement (11) can be 
transformed to statement (13), which corresponds to goal (ii). 
Kc, t2<t< t4, S(S, t, e(h(S, C, e(Nc, ks), e(Ns, kcj), ks^))) (13) 
Therefore, starting with the four initial basic assumptions, we have shown that 
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it is possible to derive, through the applications of an inference rule and different 
axioms, the two important goals of the proposed authentication protocol, 
demonstrating the validity of the protocol. This means that the timeliness of 
messages 3 and 4 has been established, and their origins can be assured. 
4.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have analyzed the security strength of the proposed 
authentication and key establishment protocol using both informal method and 
formal modal logic. In the security analysis, we have shown that the proposed 
protocol can handle effectively the target denial-of-service attack, replay attack, 
chosen-text attack, interleaving attack, reflection attack and man-in-the-middle 
attack, which are all common attacks on an authentication and key establishment 
protocol. 
There were also different types of formal security analysis methods proposed 
in the past few decades. One of the earliest approaches is the use of general-
purpose specification languages and verification tools in the descriptions and 
analyses of security protocols. However, because these general-purpose analysis 
methods are too general to capture the specific and subtle security properties of 
the cryptographic protocols, they are not quite suitable for the analysis of security 
protocols. The second method makes use of the state-based expert system to 
analyze a security protocol. However, the exhaustive searches involved in the 
analysis process can make this approach time-consuming. Also, infinite loop 
errors can easily occurred if the analysis process is not carefully designed. 
Another approach is to model the cryptographic systems as algebraic term-
rewriting systems. However, the proving process is a bit hard and further 
automation is needed. The modal logic analysis methods have received much 
attention in the literature. One of the earliest results is the famous BAN logic [11] 
proposed in 1990. Although it has been widely used for security analysis, many 
researchers have also criticized for its usefulness. In this chapter, we have 
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employed the Coffey- Saidha [17] logic, which is a logic designed for the analysis 
of public-key based cryptographic protocols, to formulate a formal proof of our 
protocol. Through these analyses, we have been able to show the validity of our 
protocol's logic and the security strength of our protocol against the wide range of 
security attacks. 
Chapter 5 
Experimental Results and Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyze the performance and effectiveness of the proposed 
protocol in carrying out the puzzle-related operations and handling attacks. This 
analysis is based on the results of a set of experiments carried out on the protocol. 
In these experiments, we have examined how fast are the puzzle generation, 
puzzle solution verification, and puzzle solving operations at different puzzle 
difficulty levels on a test platform. We have also examined how effective is the 
protocol in handling the denial-of-service attacks by applying simulated DoS 
attacks on the server employing our protocol and examining the change of the 
server load. Moreover, we have examined the improvement in the server response 
times experienced on the client side with the client puzzle mechanism enabled in 
our authentication protocol. From the results of these experiments, we can see that 
the proposed protocol is computationally efficient, and is also effective in 
handling DoS attacks as the server load can be reduced significantly by using the 
proposed client puzzle technique when it is under DoS attacks. 
5.2 Experimental Environment 
To carry the experiments, a number of computer workstations are needed. These 
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workstations are installed with a set of security-related software packages and 
programming tools. Since the architecture of our system is client-server based, the 
experimental environment requires at least two computer workstations acting as 
the client and the server. The configurations of our test server and test client are 
shown as follow. 
Table 5.1: Test Server (Platform I) 
Hardware Model Intel Pentium 4 1500MHz 
- Memory 523,760KB 
OS Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional — 
Table 5.2: Test Client (Platform II) 
Hardware Model AMD 40QMHz 
— Memory 97,848KB 
OS Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional 
For the experiments as described in sections 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 below, another set 
of workstations is needed to act as the attacker machines in our attack simulations. 
This set of attacker machines consists of two types of workstations shown in 
tables 5.3 and 5.4 below. 
Table 5.3: Attacker Machine I 
Hardware Model Sun Ultra 5/400 
Memory 512MB 
OS Solaris 8 
Network Speed 100Mbps — 
Table 5.4: Attacker Machine II 
Hardware Model Sun Ultra 5/270 一 
Memory 512MB — 
OS Solaris 8 
Network Speed 100Mbps 
The workstations mentioned in the above four tables are installed with the 
cryptographic algorithms and tools listed in table 5.5 and 5.6 below. 
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Table 5.5: Cryptographic algorithms and their settings 
One-way Hash Algorithm SHA-1 (160-bit output) 
Encryption/Decryption Algorithm RSA 
Cryptographic Key Length 1024 bits 
Length of Nonce 64 bits 
Table 5.6: Java software packages 
Java Development Kit (JDK) Version JDK Standard Edition 1.4.0 
_ _ . , Bouncy Castle Provider Release 
JCE Provider 1.12 for JDK1.4 
5.3 Experiments 
There are seven different experiments carried out to examine the proposed 
protocol. The first two of them examine the computational performance of the 
puzzle-related operations in the testing environment. The third and the fourth 
experiments examine respectively the computational performance of the 
cryptographic operations in the proposed protocol and the computational 
performance of the overall protocol session. In the fifth and the sixth experiments, 
the effectiveness of the puzzle technique in handling our simulated DoS attacks is 
examined. In the last experiment, the improvement in the server response times 
from the introduction of the client puzzles is investigated. 
5.3.1 Computational Performance of the Puzzle Solving 
Operation at different Difficulty Levels 
In the proposed protocol, one disadvantage of using the puzzle technique in 
handling DoS attacks is the overhead introduced by the puzzle solving process to 
the clients. The upper limit of the difficulty level depends on the employed one-
way hash function. If the difficulty level increases continuously, it will finally 
reach a maximum value equal to the output length of the employed one-way hash 
function. Let's call this the Real Limit (RL) of the difficulty level. In our case, this 
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value is 160 for the one-way hash function SHA-1. When this limit is reached, the 
puzzle is theoretically unsolvable because the time needed to solve the puzzle is 
infinitely long. So the aim of this experiment is to find out a limit, which is lower 
than the RL, that will not introduce too much overhead to the normal clients. 
In this experiment, we have carried out the puzzle solving operation on the 
two machines listed in tables 5.1 and 5.2 using brute force method and the average 
execution times were recorded. For each value of difficulty level k, 100 puzzle 
solving operations were carried out in each machine and the average value was 
taken. The results are depicted in figure 5.1 below. From this graph, we can see 
that the average puzzle solving time increases with the difficulty level, which is as 
expected. Also, the time needed by the puzzle solving operation increases to a 
very high value when k reaches a level greater than 20 based on these platform 
configurations. 
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Figure 5.1: Average execution time of the puzzle solving process. The dotted 
curve and the solid curve show respectively the average puzzle solving time on a 
machine with CPU speed of 400MHz and 1500MHz. 
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A puzzle of high difficulty level can introduce a very high overhead to the 
normal client. In order to minimize the impact on the normal clients, there should 
be another lower Artificial Limit (AL) for the difficulty level to prevent it from 
being increased to a very high value. However, this AL cannot be too low or the 
strength of the puzzle will be reduced. 
Since we need difficulty levels that will not introduce too much overhead to a 
normal client but at the same time can deter DoS attacks, the AL of the difficulty 
level would be around 20 based on the observation of the above graph. In the 
following experiments, whenever we refer to the maximum value of the difficulty 
level k, we mean the value of 20. 
As can be seen, there is a tradeoff between the overhead to the normal clients 
and the strength of the DoS attacks that the puzzles can handle. In future version 
of the system, if the sources of the attacks can be accurately identified, the puzzles 
can be selectively sent to the attackers only. The AL can also be raised to a much 
higher level in order to handle stronger DoS attacks without serious impact on the 
normal clients. 
5.3.2 Computational Performance of the Puzzle Generation and 
Puzzle Solution Verification 
In this experiment, the average execution times of the puzzle-related operations on 
the server side are examined. Since the primary objective of the puzzle technique 
is for handling DoS attacks, an important requirement of the puzzle technique is 
that its operations on the server side should be fast and simple. If the puzzle-
related operations are themselves time-consuming, the server would suffer from 
DoS attacks because of the large amount of puzzle-related operations requested by 
the attackers. In this experiment, the average execution times of the puzzle 
generation and puzzle solution verification were recorded to see how fast are these 
two server-side puzzle operations. 
Similar to the previous experiment, the puzzle generation and puzzle 
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verification were each carried out for 100 times on the Platform I stated in Section 
5.2 and the average values were taken. The results are presented in the following 
table: 
Table 5.7: Average execution time of the server-side puzzle operations 
Operation Average Execution Time 
Puzzle Generation 0.25ms 
T u z z l e Solution Verification 0.4ms 
In these measurements, each puzzle generation consists of the following 
sequence of operations: 
i. Determination of the difficulty level k. 
ii. Computation of the string zl = h{C, s, t). 
iii. Computation of the string z2 = h(zl). 
iv. Production of the string zl<^+l, L>, which is the to L汝 bits of the 
string zl computed in step ii. 
In this sequence of operations, only the time taken by the last one, i.e. 
production of the string zl<^+l, L>, depends on k because this sub-operation 
involves hiding the first k bits of zl. However, since the maximum value of k is 20 
and zl<k+l, L> production operation is simple enough, a different value for k has 
negligible effect on the overall execution time of the puzzle generation process. 
Besides, the puzzle solution verification process consists of the following 
sequence of operations in the puzzle solution verification time measurement. 
i. The formation of the string (C, s, t) 
ii. The computation of the string m = /i(C, s, t) 
iii. The puzzle verification process, i.e. verifying h{zV<\, k>, m<k+l, L>) = /z(m), 
where zl'cl，k> is the puzzle solution from the client and m is the string generated 
by the server in step ii. 
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In the puzzle verification process, the only place that involves the puzzle 
difficulty level is the shift operations in creating the string (zV<l, k>, m<k+l, L>). 
In our implementation, the string zl ' and m' are stored as byte arrays. If k is not 
multiple of 8 (size of a byte), the (以8+1产 byte of zl’，which is shown in figure 
5.2, needs to be shifted right by (8-A:%8) positions and then shifted left by another 
(8-A:%8) positions in order to clear the right (8-^%8) bits of this byte. Similarly, 
the (k/S+lf" byte of m needs to be shifted left by k%S positions and then shifted 
right by another k%S positions in order to clear the left A:%8 bits. After that, these 
two bytes can be ORed together to form the (以8+1产 byte of the resulting string. 
Therefore the total number of shift operations involved (i.e. 8 - k%S + 8 - k%% + 
k%% + A:%8) is independent of k, so an arbitrary difficulty level can be chosen in 
this puzzle solution verification time measurement. 
zl, _ . . V 
m E Z J ^ M ： 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Components of the 
The W/// / /A, ； resulting string 
m+m ‘ 
byte 
Figure 5.2: The formation of (zl 'cl , k>, m<k+l, L>) 
From the results, we can see that both the puzzle generation and puzzle 
solution verification processes are very fast on the test platform. In the business 
and commercial companies, the servers used are much more powerful than the test 
server used here, the average values measured on these servers should thus be 
even lower. So we can see that the server-side puzzle operations are fast and 
simple enough to be used as the operations in the puzzle mechanism for handling 
DoS attacks. 
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5.3.3 Computational Performance of the Protocol Cryptographic 
Operations 
To prevent the proposed protocol from CPU resource exhaustion attack, which is a 
type of DoS attacks, we need to prevent the server from being triggered to execute 
too many computationally expensive operations of the protocol. Cryptographic 
operations are known to be computationally expensive. In this experiment, the 
average execution times of all the cryptographic operations in the protocol were 
measured. The aim of these measurements is to verify that the cryptographic 
operations are the dominating operations among those in the protocol. 
On the server side, there are four cryptographic operations in the protocol. 
These include: 
i. The verification (decryption) of the client signature in message 3 using the 
client public key. 
ii. The encryption of the server nonce using the client public key. 
iii. The generation (encryption) of the server signature for message 4 using the 
server private key. 
iv. The decryption of the client nonce using the server private key. 
Again we tested each of the four cryptographic operations on the test platform 
I for 100 times and the average execution times were taken. The results are 
presented in the table below. 
Table 5.8: Average execution times of the cryptographic operations 
“ ‘ , . 八 “ Average Standard 
Cryptographic Operation Execution Time Deviation 
The verification (decryption) of the client signature 15.52ms 2.20ms 
in message 3 using the client public key. 
The encryption of the server nonce using the client 12.82ms 2.48ms 
public key. 
The generation (encryption) of the server signature 3115ms 1.78ms 
for message 4 using the server private key. 
The decryption of the client nonce using the server ^^ 74 ms 1 41ms 
private key. ‘ . 
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In our measurements, the length of the keys used is of 1024 bits. In particular, 
the public key is embedded inside a digital certificate, which conforms to the 
X.509 v3 International standard [81]. The digital certificates are signed by a self-
signed CA certificate. Besides, the private keys used are in PKCS8 [82] encoding 
format. 
Because of the use of digital certificates, those cryptographic operations 
involving public key include not only the encryption or decryption operation, but 
also the certificate retrieval and validation processes. 
In the certificate validation process, the CA signature and the timestamp of the 
certificate are verified. So in the cryptographic operation (i) above, the sequence 
of operations should be as follows: 
� Retrieval of the client certificate 
� Verification of the timestamp of the client certificate 
� Retrieval of the CA certificate 
� Verification of the client certificate using the CA certificate 
� Verification of the client signature 
For operation (ii), the sequence is similar except the last one is the encryption 
of the server nonce. 
For operations (iii) and (iv), since the key involved is private key rather than 
public key in a certificate, the sequences of operations are simpler, outlined as 
below: 
Operation (iii): 
� Retrieval of the server private key 
� Production of the signature for message 4 using the server private key. 
Operation (iv): 
� Retrieval of the server private key 
� Decryption of the client nonce using the server private key 
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In the proposed protocol, the puzzle solution verification process is placed 
before these cryptographic operations in order to protect them, only after the 
puzzle solution has been verified correct will these cryptographic operations be 
carried out. So the puzzle solution verification process should be much faster than 
the cryptographic operations. As can be seen from the experimental results, the 
cryptographic operations are much more time-consuming than the puzzle 
verification time (0.4ms). Among these four cryptographic operations, the 
verification of the client signature in message 3 is the first cryptographic operation 
the server needs to handle. It is the operation where an attacker can trigger the 
server to execute easily with a bogus message 3 if client puzzle is not present. 
When compared with the time needed by this signature verification process, the 
client puzzle verification process is about 39 times faster. So the client puzzle is 
efficient in guarding against those DoS attacks employing the computationally 
expensive nature of this cryptographic operation. 
Apart from the puzzle-related and cryptographic operations, we found that the 
remaining server-side operations are simple and account for only a small amount 
of the total server-side execution time. So from the measurement results here, we 
can see that the cryptographic operations dominate the server-side execution time. 
This explains why we protect the server by preventing it from handling 
prematurely too many cryptographic operations, thus preventing the protocol from 
CPU resource exhaustion attack. 
5.3.4 Computational Performance of the Overall Protocol Session 
In this experiment, the average execution time of the whole protocol session 
without the presence of client puzzle (i.e. A: = 0) was measured. The aim of this 
measurement is to get a rough idea about the total time for completing the 
authentication protocol. This measurement includes all the operations performed 
on the client and the server sides. 
Besides, the execution times of the (C, t) non-existence checking operation 
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and the (C，t) storing operation may depend on the size of the (C，t) database. In 
our protocol implementation, this database is implemented as a hash table. In this 
experiment, the hash table is initially filled with 400,000 random records as an 
example and the load factor of the hash table is set to 0.75. This load factor value 
is recommended by the Sun Microsystems, which is said to be a good tradeoff 
between time and space costs. 
The experiment was carried using the test client and server platforms as 
defined in tables 5.1 and 5.2 and the two machines are within the same local area 
network. The protocol was tested 100 times and the average value was taken. The 
average protocol execution time measured is 770.84ms. This is the time without 
the client puzzle. To have an idea on the total execution time of the protocol with 
a puzzle at difficulty level k, the puzzle solving time at this K the puzzle 
generation time and the puzzle verification time found in the previous 
experiments should be added. For example, for k = 10, the total execution time 
would be roughly 845.1ms (770.84ms+113.67ms+0.25ms+0.4ms) on average. In 
real situation, the server may be serving many clients simultaneously, which can 
lead to a longer execution time of the protocol session. 
5.3.5 Impact on the Server Load without Client Puzzles 
In the current and the next experiments, the effectiveness of the proposed 
authentication protocol in handling DoS attacks was examined. In this experiment, 
we have made use of a set of machines to apply simulated DoS attacks on a server 
employing our proposed authentication protocol. The purpose of this experiment 
is to examine how the server resource availability is affected by DoS attacks when 
the client puzzles are not employed. In the next experiment, the same was done 
but with the presence of client puzzles. In these measurements, we have 
concentrated on the more complex CPU resource type. The situation and pattern 
in the simpler memory resource type should be similar to that of the CPU resource 
type. 
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Figure 5.3: The DoS attack scenario 
In order to simulate DoS attacks, an attacker program was set up on the client 
side. This attacker program is actually a modified version of the client-side 
program of our proposed authentication protocol. It has been so implemented such 
that it will not perform any computationally expensive cryptographic operations 
including those required in message 3 and 4 of the protocol. When it receives 
message 2 from the server, it will generate an arbitrary string acting as its 
signature. This bogus signature is then returned to the server in message 3 in order 
to trigger the server to perform the expensive cryptographic operations. The client 
attacker then immediately leaves the protocol session without handling the 
remaining jobs required by the protocol. Because the client attacker requires only 
a small amount of CPU power in this attack scenario, it can generate large amount 
of malicious connections to the server in a short period of time and trigger the 
server to perform large amount of computationally expensive cryptographic 
operations. 
In our proposed authentication protocol, the RSA operations are the most time-
consuming operations in the protocol, we aim to reduce the number of RSA 
operations the server need to handle at a particular point of time. According to the 
measurements in Section 5.3.3 above, the verification (decryption) of the client 
Chapter 5 Experimental Results and Analysis 87 
signature in message 3 requires on average 15.52ms on the server side. That 
means the server can handle about 64 signature verifications per second. This is 
the speed when the server is not under DoS attacks. When the server is under DoS 
attacks, the resources of the server should be exhausted; the number of signature 
verifications that can be done in a second should then be less than 64. 
In the experiment, we have ten client machines installed with the attacker 
program as described above. In these ten attacker machines, five of them have the 
configurations of the Attacker Machine I shown in table 5.3，while the remaining 
five have the configurations of the Attacker Machine II shown in table 5.4. In 
order to overload the server, we have configured this set of attacker machines to 
produce about 83 requests, which is higher than 64, to the server per second. 
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Figure 5.4: The server load under DoS attacks without the presence of client 
puzzles. 
When a new request arrives, the number of RSA operations currently 
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committed (the server load) was recorded and the result is shown in figure 5.4 
above. As can be seen from the figure, the server is busy all the time. Sometimes, 
when the server has no more processes available to serve the new requests, the 
server load will drop after some of the current requests are handled. After that, 
when processes are available, the attacker machines immediately raise the server 
load again. This makes the server load fluctuating. On average, there are about 50 
committed RSA operations at an incoming request on the server side. In the next 
experiment, the client puzzle mechanism will be enabled with different values of 
the threshold and puzzle level parameters in order to examine how the server load 
is affected. 
5.3.6 Impact on the Server Load with Client Puzzles 
This experiment is similar to the experiment in Section 5.3.5 above except that the 
server was configured to send puzzles when the resource usage percentage reaches 
a pre-defined limit. The aim of this experiment is to examine how effective is our 
protocol in handling DoS attacks. 
On the server side, the resource usage percentage is calculated at each 
incoming request. If the percentage is higher than a pre-defined threshold, the 
server sends a puzzle to the entity making this request. This puzzle has a difficulty 
level directly proportional to the calculated resource usage percentage. 
On the client side, the same attacker program used in Section 5.3.5 was used. 
As the aim of the attackers is to cause more computationally expensive 
cryptographic operations on the server side, the attackers must provide a correct 
puzzle solution in order to trigger the server to execute these cryptographic 
operations. So this time the client attackers should solve the puzzle received in 
message 2 before sending the bogus message 3. Same as before, the attacker will 
leave immediately after sending message 3. 
In this experiment, the same testing environment, configurations and attack 
speed as the experiment in Section 5.3.5 above were employed for easy 
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comparison. In this experiment, different thresholds have been tried and the 
corresponding server loads were recorded. The results are as depicted in the 
following figures. 
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Figure 5.11: Difficulty Level Function and the corresponding server load with 
threshold set to 20% and starting difficulty level set to 10. 
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When compared with the server load recorded without the use of client 
puzzles shown in figure 5.4 above, the server load with the introduction of client 
puzzles is much lower. From the server load measurements shown in figures 5.5 -
5.9 above, the average number of committed RSA operations at an incoming 
request is about 5 while that in the case without client puzzle (figure 5.4) is about 
50. So the improvement in this simulation by the puzzles is about 90%. This 
shows that the proposed protocol is quite efficient in reducing the load of the 
server in these simulations. 
As can be seen in these graphs (figures 5.5 - 5.9), the larger the threshold, the 
higher is the server load in the initial phase of the attack. For example, in figure 
5.9, the client puzzles are not sent until the resource usage is up to a very high 
percentage, 80%. Before the resource usage percentage reaches 80%, there are not 
any puzzles sent from the server. This situation is similar to the results recorded in 
figure 5.4 where the puzzles are not present. Because of this, the attackers manage 
to raise the server load to a high level. If a normal client submits a request during 
this phase, the response time of the server will be much longer than normal. On 
the other hand, if the threshold is set to a lower level, e.g. 0%, as shown in figure 
5.5，the server load is much more uniform. But the disadvantage of a low 
threshold is that the normal clients will receive a puzzle earlier. So a suitable 
threshold value should be somewhere between 0% and 80%, e.g. 40% as shown in 
figure 5.7. 
If we want to further reduce the server load, we may use a larger difficulty 
level at the starting threshold as in the following cases. For example, in figure 5.5 
above, when we raise the difficulty level from 0 to 10 at the starting threshold, we 
can see from the result in figure 5.10 below that the server load has been reduced 
greatly when compared with the one shown in figure 5.5. However, the 
disadvantage of the Difficulty Level Functions shown in figure 5.10 and 5.11 
below is that the difficulty level is not increased gradually and thus graceful 
degradation of service is not possible. 
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5.3.7 Impact on the Server Response Time from the Puzzles 
In the previous experiment, we have seen that the server load has been reduced 
with the incorporation of the puzzle technique into our proposed authentication 
protocol. In this experiment, the improvement in the server response time 
experienced by the normal clients was investigated. Normally, when a server is 
under DoS attacks, it should be very busy. The CPU resource may also be 
consumed to a very high level. At that time, if a client submits a request to the 
server, the response time from the server should be much longer than expected. 
In the proposed protocol, the client submits two messages to the server waiting 
for the responses; these two messages are as follows: 
1. Message 1 (Authentication Request) -> Response: Message 2 from the server 
2. Message 3 — Response: Message 4 from the server 
In this experiment, the efficiency of the client puzzles in improving the server 
response times in the proposed authentication protocol was analyzed. Again, the 
testing environment and the configurations are the same as that in Section 5.3.5 
and 5.3.6. Same as in the previous two experiments, we employed the set of 10 
attacker machines shown in tables 5.3 and 5.4. As described before, these 
attackers will not perform any computationally expensive cryptographic 
operations required by the proposed protocol. However, they will solve the 
puzzles given by the server. This is because the aim of the attackers is to cause 
more computationally expensive cryptographic operations on the server side, but 
the server will not perform such expensive cryptographic operations unless a 
correct puzzle solution is returned. 
Firstly, the puzzle mechanism was disabled (i.e. Set k = 0). The (C, t) hash 
table on the server side was initialized to have 100,000 random records and load 
factor was set to 0.75. Under different cumulative attack speeds generated by the 
set of attacker machines, the response times of message 1 and 3 were recorded 
and presented in figure 5.12 below. As can be seen, the faster the attack, the longer 
is the response time. This is because the server receives more requests at a time 
when the attack speed increases, thus more resources are needed to handle these 
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requests, the response time to the normal client must then be longer. In the graph, 
we can see that the increase in attack speed has only slight effect on the response 
time of message 1. This is because puzzle generation, which is the operation the 
server requires to perform in order to give response to message 1, is a relatively 
fast operation in the proposed authentication protocol, as shown in table 5.7. 
When compared with the response time of message 1, the response time of 
message 3 increases in a much faster rate because the cryptographic operations 
required in the response of message 3 are computationally expensive, as shown in 
table 5.8. We can see that when the attack speed reaches about 4000 requests/s, 
the server requires about 17 seconds to give response to message 3, which is quite 
unacceptable; the normal users are then greatly affected by the attacks in this 
situation. 
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Figure 5.12: Server response times without client puzzles. 
In order to analyze the impact of the client puzzles on the response times of 
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the server. The above measurement process was repeated with the puzzles enabled. 
In this puzzle-enabled response time measurement, we employed the sample 
Difficulty Level Function shown in figure 5.7 and the same set of attacker 
machines used in the previous puzzle-disabled case. The results are shown in 
figure 5.13 below. 
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Figure 5.13: Server response times with client puzzles. Note the different scale in 
response time from figure 5.12. 
As can be seen from the above figure, both the response times of message 1 
and 3 were improved. For the experiment with the puzzle mechanism enabled in 
the proposed authentication protocol, the faster the attack, the more are the 
puzzles received by the attackers. When more resources of the attackers are 
consumed for solving the puzzles, the rate of the attacks will be reduced, the 
server response time can then be improved accordingly. The attack speeds shown 
in figure 5.13 are only the target attack speeds of the attackers. With the puzzle 
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mechanism enabled in the authentication protocol, the attackers are busy handling 
the puzzles; these target attack speeds will then not be able to achieve. Besides, 
because the number of requests the attackers can made in a second is reduced, the 
grow rate of the response times are also greatly improved when compared with 
the case shown in figure 5.12. So from the above simulations, we can see that the 
normal clients can have a much better services from the server with the use of the 
client puzzle mechanism in our proposed authentication protocol when the server 
is under DoS attacks. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the experimental results and their analyses on the proposed 
authentication protocol are presented. We have measured the execution times of 
the puzzle solving process and the overall protocol session. Through a series of 
experimental measurements, we can also see that the puzzle generation and puzzle 
solution verification operations are fast in nature. This property is important to 
prevent the server from DoS attacks by employing our puzzle approach. Besides, 
the effectiveness of our protocol in handling DoS attacks was investigated and we 
found that the server load measurements have different outputs with different 
threshold settings and starting difficulty levels. The load of the server was also 
reduced with the help of the puzzles. Finally, the improvement in the server 
response times experienced by the normal clients was analyzed and we have 
shown that the server response times have been improved with the puzzle 
mechanism enabled in our authentication protocol. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion and Future Work 
6.1 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis proposes a client puzzle based authentication and key establishment 
protocol, which can effectively resist the denial-of-service attacks, and other 
common contemporary attacks. The authentication protocol relies on the 
integration of our carefully designed client puzzle protocol, which can be seen as 
an improved version of the client puzzle proposed by Juels and Brainard [15], to 
tackle the network denial-of-service attacks. Further, our client puzzle protocol 
can overcome the problems inherent in the proposal of Juels and Brainard. 
In the proposed authentication protocol, for each authentication request from a 
client, a unique puzzle would be generated and sent by the server to the client. The 
client must commit its resources to solve the puzzle before extensive 
computations and memory allocations would be performed by the server. This 
cost incurred serves as a deterrent to the attacker in carrying out any server 
resource exhaustion attacks. The client puzzle protocol is quite flexible as the 
difficulty level of the puzzle can be adjusted according to the extent of server 
resources availability. This means that if the attackers manage to consume some of 
the server resources by launching numerous attacks, the server would increase 
accordingly the difficulty level of the client puzzles, which would subsequently 
consume more resources of the attackers. Therefore, the protocol could 
intelligently monitor the attackers and take countermeasures through adjusting 
101 
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adaptively the puzzle difficulty level. 
The proposed authentication protocol remains stateless and avoids performing 
the extensive public-key cryptographic computations by the server until the 
solution of the client puzzle has been verified. Thus it can resist server resource 
exhaustion attacks. The proposed authentication and key establishment protocol 
has been verified using a formal logic theory, based on the application of rules of 
inference to a set of axioms as introduced by Coffey and Saidha [17]. The logic, 
which combines the logics of knowledge and belief, enables the analysis of both 
the security and trustworthiness of public-key protocols. The success of the formal 
verification implies that the logic technique cannot detect any flaws and security 
errors from the protocol, demonstrating the validity and the trustworthiness of our 
authentication protocol. Further, informal security analysis has been carried out to 
show that the protocol can resist various common attacks. As DoS attacks have 
become widely known and can easily be exploited to attack web sites and various 
network protocols, they have created a real problem to protocol design. Protocols 
vulnerable to DoS attacks could be strengthened with the integration of our client 
puzzle protocol. 
Besides, an authentication framework has been designed and implemented for 
testing the proposed authentication and key establishment protocol. The structure 
of this framework is client-server based implementing the client and server sides 
of the proposed protocol. An end user can submit service requests through the 
provided browser interface. The server resources will then be made accessible to 
the client browser if the authentication is successful. In this framework, facilities 
are also provided to allow the end users to obtain the necessary certificates and 
keys from removable media such as floppy diskettes. This makes the accesses of 
the authentication data more portable. The experimental results of this 
implemented authentication and key establishment protocol show that the protocol 
is both computationally efficient and effective in handling the denial-of-service 
attacks. 
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6.2 Contributions 
In this thesis, we have proposed an innovative authentication and key 
establishment protocol [50] [51]. We have studied the existing authentication and 
key establishment protocols and found that they are generally weak in defending 
against denial-of-service attacks. When compared with these protocols, our 
proposed protocol is more resistant to denial-of-service attacks. Besides, we 
managed to identify some defects in the famous Juels-Brainard client puzzle 
protocol. We found that a server employing the Juels-Brainard protocol can treat a 
correct puzzle solution submitted by the client as wrong. This Juels-Brainard 
protocol is also weak in verifying the freshness of the puzzles. The solution of an 
old puzzle submitted by the client can sometimes be interpreted as solution of a 
new puzzle in the Juels-Brainard protocol. In the Juels-Brainard protocol, the 
CPU resource exhaustion attack is ignored; only the memory resource exhaustion 
attack is handled. In this thesis, solutions to these defects and an improved client 
puzzle protocol are proposed [50] [51]. Our improved client puzzle protocol 
manages to avoid the identified defects; both the CPU resource exhaustion and 
memory resource exhaustion attacks are handled. This improved client puzzle 
protocol has been integrated into the proposed authentication and key 
establishment protocol to equip it with the ability to handle denial-of-service 
attacks. In our authentication protocol, the client is required to commit its 
resources to solving the puzzle before extensive resources of the server can be 
committed to the client. This cost of attack acts as a deterrent to the DoS attackers. 
In this thesis, we have also shown how the proposed authentication protocol 
can be formally analyzed [83] using a public-key based protocol analysis logic. 
Most of the existing logical protocol analyses are based on either logic of belief or 
logic of knowledge only. A knowledge-based logic is able to analyze the security 
aspects of a protocol while the belief-based logic analyzes the trust in a protocol. 
We were able to analyze formally our protocol based on both belief and 
knowledge. Thus both the security and trustworthiness of our protocol were 
analyzed to be valid. 
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Although there are some client puzzle based authentication protocols proposed 
in the past, there are very few implementations of the proposal exist. In this thesis, 
we have developed an authentication framework for our protocol to operate and a 
number of subtle implementation issues were discussed. The experimental results 
show that the proposed authentication protocol can reduce effectively the server 
load when it is under DoS attacks. 
6.3 Future Work 
In the proposed client puzzle based authentication protocol; there is currently no 
mechanism to identify the sources of any potential incoming DoS attacks. With 
the presently proposed protocol alone, we cannot tell if an incoming request is 
from an attacker or not. When the server load is up to a certain high level, both the 
attackers and the normal clients are required to solve puzzles. So a possible 
further enhancement to the proposed protocol is the incorporation of some 
traceback mechanisms [84] [85]. These mechanisms allow the server to trace the 
sources of the potential attackers and analyze the patterns of the incoming 
requests. After identifying the sources of such attacks, the server can then 
selectively send puzzles to the potential attackers only. This enhancement can 
have the added advantage of allowing the protocol to cope with much stronger 
DoS attacks. In order to handle stronger DoS attacks, puzzles of higher difficulty 
level are required. If the server is able to identify those attackers, it can send such 
difficult puzzles to them in order to stop the attacks without degrading the quality 
of the services delivered to the normal clients. However, a primary requirement of 
these attacker-tracing mechanisms should be computationally efficient. If the 
execution of such tracing mechanisms puts too much workload on the server, the 
server could still be vulnerable to DoS attacks. 
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